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Movables and Immovables in Louisiana
and Comparative Law
A. N. Yiannopoulos*
According to Article 461 of the Louisiana Civil Code "the
third and last division of things is into movables and immov-
ables."'1 This "division" was known in Roman law2 and has
been adopted by modern civil codes.3 Its significance lies pri-
marily in the fact that different rules of property law may apply
to the different categories of things classified as movable or
immovable, in connection with the scope, acquisition, protection,
and transfer of rights.4 Further, the division of things into
movables and immovables transcends the limits of property law
and carries consequences in the fields of obligations,5 family
law,6 successions, 7 civil procedure,8 taxation,9 criminal law,10
and conflict of laws."1
*Research Associate Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. LA CrVIL CODE art. 461 (1870). Of. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 452 (1825);
LA. CIVIL CODE p. 96, art. 12 (1808).
2. Of. inra text at note 287.
3. Of. infra text at notes 290, 305.
4. See, e.g., LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 660-708 (legal servitudes) ; arts. 3472-3477
(acquisitive prescription) ; arts. 1536, 1539, 2440, 2441 (formalities of transfer) ;
arts. 3191-3251 (privileges) ; arts. 3278-3411 (mortgages) ; arts. 3176-3181 (anti-
chresis) ; arts. 3133-3175 (pledge) (1870).
5. See, e.g., Lighting Fixture Supply Co. v. Pacific Fire Ins. Co., 176 La.
499 146 So. 35 (1932) ; Boykin v. Boykin, 4 La. App. 210 (1926) ; Morris v.
Pratt, 114 La. 98, 38 So. 70 (1905).6. See, e.g., LA. CIvIL CODE arts. 2337-2382 (1870) (dotal property). Differ-
ences exist also with regard to the powers of a tutor in the administration of a
minor's property. See LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE arts. 4304, 4342 (1960).
See also Dillon v. Dillon, 35 La. Ann. 92 (1883) ; Rosata v. Cali, 4 So. 2d 54
(La. App. 1st Cir. 1941) (community property).
7. See, e.g., Succession of Allen, 48 La. Ann. 1036, 20 So. 193 (1896) ; Suc-
cession of Gamble, 23 La. Ann. 9 (1871) ; Penny v. Christmas, 7 Rob. 481 (La.
1844).
8. See, e.g., LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 80 (venue) ; art. 326 (protec-
tion and preservation of property seized) ; art. 2501 (judgment ordering delivery
of possession) ; arts. 3651-3664 (real actions) (1960).
9. See, e.g., Straus v. New Orleans, 166 La. 1035, 1055, 118 So. 125, i31
(1928) ("machinery . . . was immovable by destination, and was therefore sub-
ject to the mortgage in favor of the bondholders, and not subject to a tax lien
for the taxes levied against the personal or movable property of the corporation").
See also Albert Hanson Lumber Co. v. Board of State Affairs, 154 La. 988, 98
So. 552 (1924).
10. See, e.g,, LA. CRrm. CODE art. 63 (criminal trespass), art. 68 (unauthorized
use of movables) (1942).
11. In the field of conflict of laws immovables are governed by the law of the
situs and movables by the law of the owner's domicile. See Succession of Harris,
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The distinction of things into movables and immovables has
as its purpose, like most legal constructions, convenience of un-
derstanding and regulation. Lines of demarcation are ordinarily
drawn in accordance with prevailing notions in society bearing
on the relative economic significance of elements of wealth.
Since ancient times and up to the era of industrial revolution,
landed property was regarded as the most important species
of wealth from the viewpoints of both social and individual
interests. Hence, particular rules were developed designed to
safeguard interests connected with the use and enjoyment of
landed property. In modern times, economic emphasis has
shifted to values other than landed property and the law has
been slowly developing in new directions. In medieval civil law,
the criteria for the distinction between movables and immov-
ables were durability and utility of a thing as a source of in-
come.12 In contemporary civil law, the distinction rests, in prin-
ciple, on physical notions of mobility and on "inherent" char-
acteristics of things. For reasons of policy, however, the law
may treat as movables things which according to lay notions
could be regarded as immovables, such as standing crops.1 3 On
the other hand, the law may classify as immovables things
broadly considered to be movables, such as farm implements
and animals.' 4
IMMOVABLES
Articles 462-471 of the Louisiana Civil Code define and regu-
late the category of immovable things. Several of these articles
also furnish tests for the distinction between movables and
immovables.
Article 462 declares that "immovable things are, in general,
such as cannot either move themselves or be removed from one
placed to another."' 5 The second paragraph of the same article
indicates that the definition "strictly speaking," applies only
"to such things as are immovable by their own nature, and not
to such as are so only by the disposition of the law." The follow-
ing Article 463 indicates further that, in a broad sense, certain
179 La. 954, 155 So. 446 (1934); Succession of Packwood, 12 Rob. 366 (La.
1845).
12. See 3 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TRAITt PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FaANQAI8 68
(2d ed. 1952).
13. See, e.g., LA. R.S. 9: 4341 (1950) (pledge of standing crops).
14. See LA. CIVIL CODE art. 468 (1870).
15. Of. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 453 (1825) ; LA. CIVIL CODE p. 96, art. 13 (1808).
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things are "immovable by their nature, others by their destina-
tion, and others by the object to which they are applied." 6
Immovables by Nature
In Louisiana, the category of things immovable by their
nature includes tracts of land, trees, crops and fruits, buildings
and other constructions, and all those things which are so closely
connected with tracts of land or buildings as to be regarded as
component parts thereof. In a strict sense, this category is a
juristic abstraction. Contemporary mechanical means make pos-
sible transfer in space of immense quantities of earth, build-
ings, and various kinds of constructions. The law, however, may
regard, as it does, the ground and various things permanently
attached thereto as immovables though they could be removed
by application of extraordinary mechanical means. In this light,
it appears that immovability "by nature" is a creation of the
law based both on practical considerations and on inherent char-
acteristics of the things concerned.
(1) Tracts of land. Urban and farm lands are immovables
par excellence. In Roman law, and in some modern civil codes,
distinction is made between these two categories of land.17 In
the Louisiana Civil Code, while formal analytical distinction is
avoided, there are a number of rules applicable to rural, as dis-
tinguished from urban, estates.1
8
(2) Trees, crops, and fruits. "Standing crops and the fruits
of trees not gathered, and trees before they are cut down" are
also immovables. They are considered as "part of the land to
which they are attached" (Article 465 (1) ).19 Under this article,
all vegetation adhering to the soil should be regarded as im-
movable by nature and as insusceptible of separate ownership. 20
Legislative and judicial action, however, resulted in the recog-
nition that standing crops are not always to be treated as a part
16. Cf. LA. CIvIL CODE art. 454 (1825) ; LA. CIVIL CODE p. 96, art. 14 (1808).
17. See text at note 287 infra.
18. See, e.g., LA. CIvM CODE arts. 710, 722-726 (1870) (rural servitudes).
19. Cf. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 456 (1825) ; LA. CIVIL CODE p. 96, art. 17 (1808).
20. Plants in containers probably should be regarded as novables, unless they
qualify as immovables by destination. See I. CIVIL CODE art. 468 (1870). Trees
and plants in the ground, (even in nurseries), though destined to be transplanted,
should be regarded as immovables. See 3 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TRAITS PRATIQUE
DE DROIT CIVIL FRANQAIS 76 (2d ed. 1952).
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of the land,21 and that standing timber is an immovable distinct
from the ground.22
The question of the status of crops arises typically in cases
involving transfer or mortgage of lands. In the absence of par-
ticular contractual provisions, interested parties claim standing
or gathered crops as included in, or excluded from, the transfer
or mortgage by virtue of Article 465 (1). As to gathered crops,
the rule is clear: they are not a part of the land and are not
included in either transfer or mortgage. 23 But it is argued that
standing crops, as immovables, should follow the ownership of
the ground in all cases. 24 This solution might leave without pro-
tection lessees cultivating the ground, in accordance with the
terms of a recorded lease, and purchasers of standing crops.
Louisiana courts, therefore, felt early the necessity of restrictive
interpretation and it was held in Porche v. Bodin25 that Article
465 (1) applies in connection with transfer or mortgage of lands
only where the crops belong to the owner of the ground.26 Where
21. See, e.g., LA. R.S. 9:4341 (1950) (pledge of standing crops). Cf.
SAUNDERS, LECTURES ON THE CIVIL CODE 155 (1925) : "Crops which are grown
with these advances are then treated in law as not making part of the real estate,
but as being a separate item of movable property belonging to the owner of the
land. . . . Accordingly crops do not fall under operation of the mortgage [on the
land] until the lender of the money with which the crops are made has been
repaid."
22. According to La. Acts 1904, No. 188, § 1 (LA. R.S. 9:1103 (1950))
"Standing timber shall remain an immovable, and be subject to all the laws rela-
tive to immovables, even when separated in ownership from the land on which it
stands." Standing timber is treated as an immovable having an independent exist-
ence for all purposes. See SAUNDERS, LECTURES ON THE CIVIL CODE 156 (1925).
Dead timber is movable. See Gillespie v. W. A. Ransom Lumber Co., 132 F. Supp.
11 (E.D. La. 1955), aff'd, 234 F.2d 285 (5th Cir. 1956). It is settled in Louisiana
that trees are not fruits of the soil. Vance v. Sentell, 178 La. 749, 152 So. 513
(1933) ; Harang v. Bowie Lumber Co., 145 La. 96, 81 So. 769 (1919). On the
status of timber as immovables, see The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court
for the 1948-1949 Term-Property, 10 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 175, 176 (1950) ;
Comment, The Sale of Standing Timber in Louisiana, 20 TUL. L. REV. 428
(1946) ; Note, 15 TUL. L. REV. 475 (1941).
23. See Alliance Trust Co. v. Gueydan Bank, 162 La. 1062, 111 So. 421
(1927). See also Andrus v. His Creditors, 46 La. Ann. 1351, 16 So. 215 (1894).
In case of sale, delivery of gathered crop is necessary to affect interests of third
parties. See Succession of Minter v. Opposition of Union Cent. Life Ins. Co.,
180 La. 38, 156 So. 167 (1934).
24. See Colligan v. Benoit, 13 La. App. 612, 128 So. 688 (1st Cir. 1930)
Napper v. Welch, 2 La. App. 256 (2d Cir. 1925) ; Adams v. Moulton, 1 McGloin
210 (La. 1880) ; Williamson v. Richardson, 31 La. Ann. 685 (1879) ; Baird v.
Brown, 28 La. Ann. 842 (1876) ; Bludworth v. Hunter, 9 Rob. 256 (La. 1844).
25. 28 La. Ann. 761 (1876). The decision was founded in part on the prin-
ciple that "no one should be permitted to enrich himself at the expense of another."
Id. at 763.
26. This decision was followed by La. Acts 1906, No. 100, LA. R.S. 9: 5105
(1950), which provides that a lessee's growing crops are not subject to the debts




the crops do not belong to the owner of the ground, neither
transfer nor mortgage of the land confers a valid title to the
standing crop. Presumably, standing crops in these circum-
stances are regarded as movable.2 7 Separate ownership of stand-
ing crops may derive from lease2 8 or sale29 which, in order to
affect interests of third parties, must be duly recorded. In this
case, the interests of the purchaser of standing crops, and the
interests of the lessee and his creditors are amply protected in
spite of subsequent seizure30 or transfer of the land.31 The rule
of Porche v. Bodin may tend to blur traditional concepts and
may depart from solutions given under modern continental
codes; however, it leads to equitable solutions and accords with
the policy favoring cultivation.
Several cases are concerned with crops produced on mort-
gaged or seized lands. The general rule is that the fruits of
mortgaged lands are subject to the mortgage only while they
are in the hands of the mortgagor, and that fruits accruing after
transfer of the land to a bona fide purchaser and possessor are
not subject to the mortgage. 2 Crops maturing and collected
while the land is mortgaged may be seized and sold by creditors
other than the mortgagee.33 But "the fruits of an immovable,
gathered or produced while it is under seizure, are considered
as making part thereof, and inure to the benefit of the person
making the seizure" (Article 466) .34 In interpreting this ar-
27. See SAUNDERS, LEcTuREs ON THE CIVIL CODE 155 (1925) : "[T]he crops
grown by the tenant ... are not regarded a part of the land; they are regarded
as the personal property of the tenant and liable to his debts, and not liable to
the debts of the owner of the land except in so far as the tenant may be indebted
to him." Cf. Rosata v. Cali, 4 So.2d 54 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1941). The court
held that standing strawberries were movable property. Article 465 was not men-
tioned. The holding rested, primarily, on equity considerations. See also Fallin
v. J. J. Stovall & Sons, 141 La. 220, 74 So. 911 (1917).
28. See Porche v. Bodin, 28 La. Ann. 761 (1876).
29. See Succession of Minter v. Opposition of Union Life Ins. Co., 180 La.
38, 156 So. 167 (1934) ; Napper v. Welch, 2 La. App. 256, 257 (2d Cir. 1925).
The right of the purchaser may be regarded as "equivalent to an anticipatory
mobilization." See Williamson v. Richardson, 31 La. Ann. 685, 687 (1879). In
France, standing crops have been classified as "movables by anticipation." See 3
PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TRAITA PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANQAIS 104 (2d ed.
1952).
30. See Vosburg v. Federal Land Bank, 172 So. 567 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1937);
Federal Land Bank v. Carpenter, 164 So. 487 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1936).
31. Cf. Deville v. Couvillon, 5 La. App. 519 (2d Cir. 1927).
32. See Bludworth v. Hunter, 9 Rob. 256 (La. 1844). See also Skillman v.
Lacy, 5 Mart.(N.S.) 50 (La. 1826).
33. See Alliance Trust Co. v. Gueydan Bank, 162 La. 1062, 111 So. 421
(1927).




ticle, the courts have pointed out that gathered crops do not
change status; they are still regarded as immovable and follow
the soil. 85 The rule should be understood as limited to cases in
which the crops seized belong to the owner of the soil.8
The precepts of the Code have undergone changes in this
area which seem to defy accurate classification of standing crops
within the established categories of movables and immovables.
According to the letter of Article 465(1) standing crops are
immovable and a part of the soil. Louisiana courts, however,
thought it necessary and convenient to recognize the possibility
of separate ownership of standing crops, and attendant rights
of creditors to seize and sell the crops separately from the
ground. This means that standing crops, though immovable, are
susceptible of rights separate from those existing in the soil,
and may, for certain purposes, be treated as movable. Thus,
today, reasoning a priori from the premise that standing crops
are immovable and a part of the soil may be grossly misleading.
Instead, consideration of specific rules applicable to standing
crops- apart from conceptual generalizations -seems to be
the only accurate method of analysis.
(3) Buildings and other structures. Buildings and other
structures "whether they have their foundations in the soil or
not"87 are, according to Article 464, immovable by their nature.
What is a "building" or any "other structure" which could
qualify as immovable under Article 464 is left for judicial deter-
mination according to prevailing notions in society.
Buildings
Apart from difficulties connected with the definition of the
word "buildings,"' 8 Louisiana courts have faced additional dif-
ficulties in determining the consequences of the classification
of buildings as "immovable by nature." According to traditional
civilian conceptions ownership of immovabies is not suspectible
of horizontal division.3 9 Thus, if buildings were always regarded
35. See Townsend v. Payne, 42 La. Ann. 909, 8 So. 626 (1890).
36. Cf. 8upra text at note 26.
37. Of. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 455 (1825) ; LA. CIVIL CODE p. 96, art. 16 (1808).
See also Vaughn v. Kemp, 4 La. App. 682 (2d Cir. 1926).
38. See Scovel v. Shadyside Co., 137 La. 918, 927, 69 So. 745, 749 (1915):
"The meaning of the word 'building' is not clear, and may have been used either
as a synonym for 'residence', or as applicable to any building other than mills,
distilleries, refineries, and other manufactories mentioned in the preceding para-
graph."
39. See SOIIM-MITTEIS-WENGER, INSTITUTIONEN DES ROMISCHEN RECHTs 258
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as immovable by nature according to the unqualified declaration
of Article 464, they should be insusceptible of separate owner-
ship and should, in all cases, follow the ground. Obviously, this
result would afford excessive protection to landowners to the
detriment of persons erecting edifices on the land of another,
in good faith or with the consent of the landowner.
In continental legal systems, inequitable results are avoided
by code articles indicating that buildings are component parts
of the ground and insusceptible of separate real rights only
when they belong to the owner of the ground. 40 Buildings erected
by lessees and other persons having a contractual or real right
do not belong to the owner of the ground; these buildings are
regarded as movables.41
Louisiana courts, apparently proceeding on the assumption
that ownership of immovables was not susceptible of horizontal
division, felt compelled in certain instances, in order to avoid
inequitable results, to admit that buildings erected on leased
ground could be treated as movables. 42 In other instances, how-
ever, Louisiana courts seemed to indicate that buildings are
always immovables and insusceptible of separate ownership or
other real rights. 43 Gradually, the original assumption became
(1923) ; 3 ENNECCEaUS-KIPP-WOLFF, SACHENRECHT 355-56 (1957) ; Lasyone v.
Emerson, 220 La. 951, 57 So.2d 906 (1952) ; Boyle v. Swanson, 6 La. Ann. 263
(1.851) (transfer of dwelling house separate from the land on which it was sit-
uated could not be recognized in law; land and building were inseparable from
their nature and should be sold together) ; Comment, Individual Ownership of
Apartments in Louisiana, 19 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 668 (1959). Exceptions to
the rule, however, are well established in contemporary continental law by custom,
jurisprudence, or legislative action. Of. GREEK CIVIL CODE art. 1002; German
Law of March 15, 1951 (ownership of individual apartments); 3 PLANIOL ET
RIPERT, TRAIT PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANQAIS 262 et seq. (2d ed. 1952).
40. See GERMAN CIVIL CODE art. 95; GREEK CIVIL CODE art. 955. For the
situation in France, see 3 PLANIOL ET RiPERT, TRAiTt PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL
FEANgAIS 268-278 (2d ed. 1952).
41. See 1 STAUDINGER, KOMMENTAR ZUM BORGERLICHEN GESETZBUCH, ALLGE-
MEINER TEIL 464 (1957) ; BALIS, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CIVIL LAw 512 (1955)
(in Greek).
42. See Weil v. Kent, 52 La. Ann. 2139, 28 So. 295, 298 (1900): "Houses
though declared by the Code to be immovables by their nature . . . are sometimes
held to be movable." Cf. McCormick v. Louisiana & N.W.R.R., 109 La. 764, 33
So. 762 (1903) (depot erected on another's ground, ordered to be removed at the
request of the owner of the ground). See also SAUNDERS, LECTURES ON THE CIVIL
CODE 154 (1925) : "Under certain circumstances and conditions the structures
upon the land are regarded as movables. Where the owner of land permits some-
one not the owner to erect structures upon his land, the buildings or structures
so erected with the consent of the owner do not form a part of the land so as to
fall under the ownership of the owner of the land. They retain their character
of movables and belong to the person who put them there with the license of
the owner of the land."
43. See Boyle v. Swanson, 6 La. Ann. 263 (1851) ; Miller v. Michoud, 11 Rob.
225 (La. 1845) (lessee cannot mortgage buildings erected on lessor's ground; he
1962]
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forgotten, and courts, although granting the proposition that
buildings are always immovables, seemed to indicate the possi-
bility of separate ownership. 44 A legislative attempt to classify
buildings on leased ground as movables failed,45 and today it
is well settled in Louisiana that, under the Civil Code, buildings
are immovable by nature whether they belong to the owner of
the ground or not.40
It is also settled that buildings, erected with the consent of
the landowner,47 by a lessee or any other person having a con-
tractual or real right,48 belong to these persons rather than to
the owner of the ground. These buildings are regarded, ap-
parently for all purposes, as immovables by nature. Thus, they
may be subjected by their owner to a real mortgage rather than
to a chattel mortgage.49
This modern distinction between the concepts of ownership,
on the one hand, and immovability, on the other, carries signifi-
has not an immovable interest) ; New Orleans v. Campbell, Man. Unrep. Cas. 47
(La. 1880) (buildings erected by a lessee belong to the owner of the soil; the
lessee has merely a dominium utile, namely, the right to use and enjoyment, and
the right to claim compensation from the owner or take away the buildings at the
end of the lease; this right is not subject to mortgage). Cf. Louisiana Land &
Pecan Co. v. Gulf Lumber Co., 134 La. 784, 64 So. 713 (1914) ; Vaughn v. Kemp,
4 La. App. 682 (2d Cir. 1926).
44. See Buchler v. Fourroux, 193 La. 445, 190 So. 640 (1939); Lange v.
Baranco, 32 La. Ann. 697 (1880) ; Keary v. Ducote, 23 La. Ann. 196 (1871) ;
Davis-Wood Lumber Co. v. Insurance Co. of North America, 154 So. 760 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1934) ; Scardino v. Maggio, 15 La. App. 444, 131 So. 217 (1st
Cir. 1931) ; Dougherty v. Yazoo & M.V. Ry., 9 La. App. 295, 119 So. 543 (lst
Cir. 1928) (a barn on leased premises owned by tenant) ; Di Crispino v. Bares,
5 Orl. App. 69, 71 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1908) ("In no sense can this house owned
by one person and built on the land of another, be deemed inseparable from the
land, from the standpoint of either fact or law").
45. See Buchler v. Fourroux, 193 La. 445, 190 So. 640 (1939) ; La. Acts
1918, No. 198; Comment, Chattel Mortgages on Buildings on Leased Ground, 13
TuL. L. REV. 600 (1939).
46. An exception has been established by LA. R.S. 9: 5351 (1950), as amended
by La. Acts 1952, No. 50 and La. Acts 1956, No. 90. According to this section
buildings erected "under the Farm Storage Facility Loan Program formulated
by the Commodity Credit Corporation and the Production and Marketing Ad-
ministration of the United States Department of Agriculture, or either of such
agencies . . . shall, notwithstanding any other provision of the Revised Statutes
or of the Civil Code, have the status of a movable for the purpose of the [chattel]
mortgage."
47. It is a matter of speculation whether the same rule applies to buildings
erected without the consent of the landowner. In these circumstances Louisiana
courts may follow faithfully Article 508 of the Civil Code.
48. See Davis-Wood Lumber Co. v. Insurance Co. of North America, 154 So.
760 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1934) ; DiCrispino v. Bares, 5 Orl. App. 69, 71 (La. App..
Orl. Cir. 1908) : "The fact that the house stood on defendant's land is immaterial,
it was placed there with the defendant's consent to remain the property of plain-
tiff until purchased from him." But cf. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2726 (1870).
. 49. See LA. R.S. 9:5102 (1950). But. cf. Miller v. Michoud, 11 Rob. 225
(La. 1845).
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cant legal consequences. Persons erecting edifices on another's
land with the consent of the landowner apparently always enjoy
the protection of real property laws vis-a-vis the owner of the
ground, and, if their interests are recorded, with respect to third
persons. The recognition of separate ownership in lands and
buildings as distinct immovables has also affected the scope of
the rule that buildings are included in case of transfer or encum-
brance of the land. Application of this rule is necessarily limited
to buildings which belong to the owner of the ground and build-
ings which may be presumed to belong to him in the absence of
recordation.50 Thus, unless recorded, a lease does not entitle a
lessee to claim ownership of a building erected on the lessor's
land against third parties in case of sale or mortgage executed
by the landowner; in these circumstances the title of the lessee
is lost.51
Component parts of buildings
The Code regards as immovable by nature things such as
"wire screens, water pipes, radiators, electric wires, electric and
gas lighting fixtures, lavatories, gasplants, meters and electric
light plants, heating plants and furnaces, when actually con-
nected with or attached to the building by the owner for the
use and convenience of the building." (Article 467) 52 Originally,
Article 467 provided that "the pipes made use of for the purpose
of bringing water to a house or other estate, are immovable, and
are part of the tenement to which they are attached." 53 To solve
a controversy as to whether the original Article 467 could apply
by analogy, an amendment was passed by the Louisiana legisla-
ture in 1912, 54 producing the lengthy list, with the additional
50. See Federal Bank v. Cook, 179 La. 857, 155 So. 249 (1934) (mortgage;
residence included) ; Westwego Canal & Terminal Co. v. Pizanie, 174 La. 1068,
142 So. 691 (1932) (sale; buildings included) ; Coltharp v. West, 127 La. 430,
53 So. 675 (1910) (mortgage; residence included). See also Prevot v. Courtney,
241 La. 313, 129 So.2d 1 (1961) (party acquiring real property on faith of public
records acquires valid title to all buildings and improvements on the land) ; Bacque
v. Darby, 69 So.2d 145 (La. App. 1954) (buildings and other improvements, in
the absence of stipulation to the contrary, were conveyed by an act of partition).
51. See Louisiana Land & Pecan Co. v. Gulf Lumber Co., 134 La. 784, 64 So.
713 (1914) ; Vaughn v. Kemp, 4 La. App. 682 (2d Cir. 1926). The lessee, how-
ever, may have a claim against the landowner for the value of his improvements.
Prevot v. Courtney, 241 La. 313, 129 So.2d 1 (1961).
52. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 467 (1870), as amended by La. Acts 1912, No. 51.
53. See LA. CIVIL CODE art. 458 (1825); LA. CIVIL CODE p. 98, art. 18
(1808).
54. La.. Acts 1912, No. 51; Zengel, Elements of the Law of Ownership, in 3
WEST'S L.S.A.-CmL CODE 20 (1950). But see Comment, Immovables by Nature
under Article 467 of the Civil Code, 20 LOUISIANA LAw REVIEw 410, 411, n. 7
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declaration that these things were immovable by nature. Sub-
sequently, it has been correctly held that the enumeration is in-
dicative rather than exclusive. 55 Thus things which are com-
ponent parts of a building and all mechanisms incorporated
therein and destined to complete it should be regarded as im-
movable by nature under Article 467. "Buildings" are not mere
skeletons and a framework of walls; balconies, lifts, electric
networks, and a number of appliances should be treated as
legally inseparable from the structure itself. Additions to a
building, such as partitions, new roofs, mezzanines, resulting
from incorporation of materials into an existing building have
also been regarded as immovable by nature, but under Article
464, rather than under Article 467.50 Louisiana courts have
regarded as immovables by nature and as part of a building
(under Article 467) a steam heating system,"1 a hot water
heater,58 a safe,5 9 and a butane gas system.60  Venetian blinds,
on the other hand, have been held to be movable."'
Article 467 establishes criteria for the definition of things
immovable by nature as part of a building-movables "connected
with or attached to the building by the owner for the use or
convenience of the building." The test of "the use or con-
venience" is broad enough to include almost everything imagin-
able and in part overlaps with the last paragraph of the follow-
ing Article 468.62 Thus, the same thing could be classified as
(1960): "The Louisiana courts had no opportunity to apply Article 467 before
it was amended."
55. See Scott v. Brennan, 161 La. 1017, 109 So. 822 (1926).
56. See Lighting Fixture Supply Co. v. Pacific Fire Ins. Co., 176 La. 499, 502,
146 So. 35, 39 (1933). In this case, "office fixtures, shelving, mezzanine floor,
and other so called betterments and improvements placed by the lessee in the
leased premises became immovable by nature" and the property of the lessor.
The lessee, the court said, had an "immovable right" in the use and enjoyment
of these items for the duration of the lease.
57. See Petty v. Jones, 10 La. App. 409, 121 So. 372 (Orl. Cir. 1929).
58. See Scott v. Brennan, 161 La. 1017, 1020, 109 So. 822, 823 (1926). The
court also said that "bath tubs, lavatories, closets, and sinks, connected with the
water pipes in a building are unquestionably immovable by nature."
59. See Folger v. Kenner, 24 La. Ann. 436 (1872).
60. See Cottonport Bank v. Dunn, 21 So.2d 525 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1945).
See also Holicer Gas Co. v. Wilson, 45 So.2d 96 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1950), dis-
cussed infra note 65.
61. See Kelieher v. Gravois, 26 So.2d 304 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1946) ; Note, 7
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 429 (1947). The jurisprudence is not clear as to what
kind of attachment is meant by Article 467. The question, in the last analysis, may
depend on the purpose of adjudication. See infra text at notes 152-177. See also
Comment, Immovables by Nature under Article 467 of the Civil Code, 20 LOUISI-
ANA LAW REVIEW 410, 415 (1960).
62. See infra text at note 79. It has been observed that immovables by nature
under Article 467 differ from immovables by destination under Article 468 in that
"Article 467 as amended apparently contemplates only. a connection or attachment
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immovable by nature and immovable by destination. A proper
interpretation of Article 467 should limit its scope to component
parts of a building; in this way the line of demarcation between
things immovable by nature and immovable by destination would
not be blurred. The law applicable to these two categories of
things may differ in some particulars. It can therefore be seen
that clear distinctions are not merely a matter of legal esthetics."
According to the wording of the Code, there is a distinction
between immovables by nature under Articles 464 and 467.
Thus, in the case of buildings or other structures, attachment
to the ground by the owner is not, in terms, a material con-
sideration ;s4 but, component parts of a building, in order to
become immovable by nature under Article 467 must be installed
by the owner or on his behalf." This requirement blurs tradi-
of a movable for it to become immobilized by nature, while Article 468 pertaining
to immovables by destination requires a permanent attachment." Comment, Im-
movables by Nature under Article 467 of the Civil Code, 20 LoUISIANA LAW
REVIEW 410, 412 (1960).
63. For example, a sale of an immovable by nature under Article 464 includes
all immovables by destination appertaining thereto, and all immovables by nature
under Article 467. It is possible that certain things which might not qualify as
immovable by destination could be included in the sale as immovable by nature
under Article 467. This result has been regarded as one of the reasons for the
amendment of Article 467 in 1912. See Comment, Immovable8 by Nature under
Article 467 of the Civil Code, 20 LOuISIANA LAW REVIEW 410, 413 (1960).
Further, classification of things as immovable by nature under Article 464 rather
than as immovable by destination under Article 468 may be determinative in
the relations between landowners and lessees. See Lighting Fixture Supply Co.
v. Pacific Fire Ins. Co., 176 La. 499, 511, 146 So. 35, 39 (1932): "Some of
these betterments and improvements, probably, were so incorporated into the
building as to be a component part of it -and hence a part of an immovable by
nature. . . . Therefore did not belong to the lessee. Other parts . . . were, prob-
ably, not incorporated into the building as to be a component part of it; and
such parts . . . would have continued to belong to the lessee, but for the stipula-
tion to the contrary in the contract of lease" (concurring opinion by O'Niell, C.J.).
See also infra text at notes 81-83.
64. See Buchler v. Fourroux, 193 La. 445, 190 So. 640 (1939); Vaughn v.
Kemp, 4 La. App. 682 (1926). See also Whiteman v. Le Blanc, 28 La. Ann. 430
(1876).
65. This requirement of "unity of ownership" was apparently disregarded in
Holicer Gas Co. v. Wilson, 45 So.2d 96 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1950). In this case,
according to the terms of a lend-lease agreement, plaintiff placed on the premises
a butane gas tank. Later the landowner sold the land to defendant who claimed
that the tank passed to him under the act of sale as immovable by nature. The
court found that the gas tank in question had become immovable by nature under
Articles 467 and 464 and that the ownership of the plaintiff was lost. In a sub-
sequent case involving almost identical facts the same court overruled the Holicer
case and reached the opposite conclusion. See Edwards v. S. & R. Gas Co., 73
So.2d 590 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1954). The decision was founded on the ground
that the requirements of Article 467 had not been met: the tank had not been
attached to the ground by the "owner." The rule of this case was adopted by the
Louisiana Legislature by La. Acts 1954, No. 49, LA. R.S. 9:1106 (Supp. 1960).
The act provides that all tanks placed on rural or urban property by one other
than the owner of the land for the storage of liquefied gas or liquefied fertilizer
shall remain movable and shall not be affected by a sale of the land.
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tional concepts as it seems to imply the possibility of separate
ownership over component parts of a building. Thus, improve-
ments and additions made by a person with the consent of the
owner may not result in their becoming immovables. While this
rule may tend to protect interests of lessees,"6 it runs counter
to economic considerations of utility. Lands and buildings (with
their essential parts) should be regarded as an economic unity.
In this case, indeed, real rights of third parties over component
parts of an immovable would be extinguished. However, recourse
against the owner of the land or building could be had in other
ways.67
Louisiana courts, following the language of the Code, draw a
distinction as to whether a thing in a building or on a tract of
land is placed for the convenience of the immovable or for the
convenience of the occupant. In the latter instance, immobiliza-
tion is excluded. 8 It would seem that this test should not be
controlling in the case of component parts of an immovable.
Here we are concerned with a factual determination: whether
a movable is or is not a component part; and in the determina-
tion of this question convenience of the occupant or of the im-
movable could be taken into account among several other con-
siderations.
Other structures
Structures other than buildings, though grounded on the
soil, are seldom regarded by the courts as immovable by nature
under Article 464. Actually, Louisiana courts either disregard
66. This requirement was apparently inserted in amended Article 467 for the
protection of lessees from the lessor's creditors or purchasers. Obviously, things
which the lessee attaches to a building do not meet this requirement. See Richard-
son v. Item Co., 172 La. 421, 134 So. 380 (1931) ; Comment, Immovable8 by
Nature under Article 467 of the Civil Code, 20 LOUiSIANA LAW REVIEW 410, 413
(1960). But of. Lighting Fixture Supply Co. v. Pacific Fire Ins. Co., 176 La.
499, 146 So. 35 (1933).
67. See LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 508, 2726 (1870). In continental legal systems,
in addition to remedies similar to those available under the Louisiana Civil Code,
there is available an action for unjust enrichment. See GEaMAN CIVIL CODE arts.
812-822; GREEK CIVL CODE arts. 904-913.
68. See Day v. Coff, 2 La. App. 75 (2d Cir. 1925) ; Kelieher v. Gravois, 26
So.2a 304 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1946). According to the wording of amended
Article 467, both the tests of "unity of ownership" and "convenience of the
building" should be met before a thing is treated as immovable by nature as part
of a building. See Edwards v. S. & R. Gas Co., 73 So.2d 590, 592 (La. App. 2d
Cir. 1954) : "Our difference from the author of the Holicer opinion is first, the
tank was not truly an accessory to the fundus; second, it was employed in the
service of the fundus, but in the service of the person who owned the fundus; and
third, it was not placed on the fundus by the owner of both the fundus and the
movable."
[Vol. XXII
1962] MOVABLES AND IMMOVABLES
this part of Article 464 or tend to apply a very narrow inter-
pretation. In the absence of foundations, a certain degree of
.integration with the soil seems to be necessary. A canal,6 9 a
cistern, 70 a brick pit,71 a corn mill,72 and a gas tank7 have been
classified as immovable by nature. It is obvious that some of
these structures could be regarded as component parts of build-
ings. A derrick" erected by a lessee for the purpose of drilling
a well has been held to be a movable and not a structure under
Article 464. Similarly, although railroad tracks may become
immovable by destination, 75 they are not "structures" and there-
fore may not become immovable by nature. 76
For a structure to be included under Article 464, apart from
other considerations, a certain degree of permanence is neces-
sary. In France, constructions erected on the occasion of an
exhibiton are regarded as immovable by nature, though destined
to be demolished. Tents and barracks, on the other hand, erected
on the occasion of a fair, are regarded as movable. 77
69. See Albert Hanson Lumber Co. v. Board of State Affairs, 154 La. 988, 98
So. 552 (1924).
70. See Polhman v. De Bouchel, 32 La. Ann. 1158 (1880).
71. See Folse v. Loreauville Sugar Factory, 156 So. 667 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1934).
72. See Bigler v. Brashear, 11 Rob. 484 (La. 1845).
73. See Monroe Auto & Supply Co. v. Cole, 6 La. App. 337 (2d Cir. 1927).
See also Prevot v. Courtney, 241 La. 313, 129 So.2d 1 (1961) (tractor shed and
poultry house immovables by nature under Article 464) ; Holicer Gas Co. v. Wilson,
45 So.2d 96 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1950) (a butane gas tank held immovable by nature
as a "construction"). But cf. Edwards v. S. & R. Gas Co., 73 So.2d 590 (La.
App. 2d Cir. 1954).
74. Jones v. Conrad, 154 La. 860, 98 So. 397 (1924).
75. This means that the nature of a railroad laid as movable or immovable is
determined under Article 468 rather than 464. See State v. Mexican Gulf Co.,
3 Rob. 513 (syllabus) (La. 1843): "A railway is not an immovable, either by
nature or destination, when the soil on which it is laid belongs to another";
Woodward v. American Exposition Ry., 39 La. Ann. 566, 569, 2 So. 413, 414
(1887) : "As the railroad was constructed on the soil of another, it was movable
property, and as such governed by the law regulating pledges on movables." Most
cases actually involve vendor's liens which are upheld against claims by mort-
gagees or purchasers of the immovable property on which the railroad is laid.
See Louisiana Ry. & Nay. Co. v. Cash Grocery & Sales Co., 150 So. 57 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1933) ; Caldwell v. Laurel Grove Co., 175 La. 928, 144 So. 718 (1932).
See also infra note 76.
76. Caldwell v. Laurel Grove Co., 175 La. 928, 144 So. 718 (1932) ; La. Ry.
& Nay. Co. v. Cash Grocery & Sales Co., 150 So. 57 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1933).
But cf. Morgan's La. & Tex. Ry. & S.S. Co. v. Himalaya Planting & Mfg. Co.,
143 La. 460, 78 So. 735 (1918) (railroad laid immovable by nature as "struc-
tures" under Article 464 of the Civil Code). This case was expressly overruled
by the Louisiana Supreme Court in Caldwell v. Laurel Grove Go., supra. In
France, a railroad laid is regarded as immovable by nature. See Note, 8 TuL. L.
Riy. 280 (1933).




Articles 468 and 469 of the Louisiana Civil Code concern
"immovables by destination." These are things movable by their
nature but classified as immovable because of their close asso-
ciation with an immovable. They preserve their identity as
movables and do not become component parts of the ground or
of a building; thus, they differ from "immovables by nature"
under Articles 464 and 467. The fiction of immobilization rests
on policy considerations: it is expedient that, for certain pur-
poses, movables should be regarded as accessories to an im-
movable, forming with the latter an economic unity. Indeed, if
care were not taken in this or some other way, certain acces-
sories would be regarded as movables and they would not follow
the immovable in case of seizure, partition, transfer, and deter-
mination of matrimonial rights - contrary to considerations of
utility and productivity.
From the viewpoint of abstract logic, the category of things
"immovable by destination" seems to be clear; in practice, how-
ever, Louisiana courts have found it difficult to distinguish in
some instances between things immovable by destination and
things immovable by nature. Indeed, it has been observed that
Articles 467 and 468 overlap in part,78 and it has been held that
"either article is broad enough to include a sprinkling system
by necessary implication," and that "the terms [immovables by
nature and immovables by destination] create fictions of law
and may be considered interchangeable. 7 9 Indeed, in principle,
immovables by destination are subject to the same rules of law
as immovables by nature; thus, a real mortgage extends to all
accessories of a tract of land or building.8 But, contrary to
broad judicial language, it seems that the classification of a thing
as immovable by nature or by destination does carry significant
legal consequences. In case a movable becomes immovable by
78. See supra text at note 62.
79. Tangipahoa Bank & Trust Co. v. Kent, 70 F.2d 139, 141 (5th Cir. 1934).
80. See infra text at note 162. Cf. SAUNDERS, LECTURES ON THE CIVIL CODE
157 (1925) : "[S]uch movables as have been immobilized .. .become subject to
the operation of all mortgages that rest upon the place, whether already in exist-
ence before the movables were brought on the place or whether it was granted
after the movables were brought on the plantation." Similarly, the sale of an im-
movable includes both immovables by nature under Article 467 and immovables
by destination. See supra note 63. Further, under Article 645 of the Code of
Practice (1870) neither immovables by nature under Article 467 of the Civil
Code nor immovables by destination could be seized separately from the land.
See Tison v. Taniehill, 28 La. Ann. 793 (1876). The new Code of Civil Procedure
does not include a corresponding provision.
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destination, immobilization is less complete than in the converse
situation in which a movable becomes immovable by nature. A
vendor's lien on a movable may be lost when the movable be-
comes part of an immovable by incorporation, while it is pre-
served in the case of immovables by destination.8 1 Similarly,
ownership of a movable may be lost when it is incorporated
into an immovable, while it is preserved in case of an immobili-
zation by destination.82 Further, there may be differences with
regard to the applicable tests for immobilization under Articles
464, 467, and 468.83
The category of things immovable by destination is post-
classical and of doubtful utility. Texts in the Digest are fre-
quently cited in support of this analytical category. The Roman
jurists cited, however, were simply concerned with the concrete
issue of what passes with a transfer of immovables in case of
sale or inheritance.84 There is no indication that these jurists
were concerned with the nature of things. Medieval writers
elaborating on the Digest rationalized the particular solutions
as sustaining the idea that certain accessories, having become
81. Lighting Fixture Supply Co. v. Pacific Fire Ins. Co., 176 La. 449, 146 So.
35 (1932) : "If an article of machinery, or other betterment of improvement,
which has been sold to the owner of the immovable by nature, and placed by him
upon or in the immovable by nature, the article retains its character as a movable
quo ad the seller, until the price is paid, and is subject to the seller's lien, if the
article sold has not lost its identity by being incorporated into the immovable by
nature. . . . But, if the movable article so sold has become so incorporated into
the immovable by nature as to lose its identity as a movable, and as to become a
component part of the immovable by nature, such as building material, it has
ceased to be movable property, even as to the seller, and his lien is thereby lost."
(Concurring opinion by O'Niell, C.J.). "The question of when or under what
circumstances this merger will be held to have taken place is one to be determined
from the particular facts of each case." Receivership of Augusta Co., 134 La. 971,
974, 64 So. 870, 871 (1914). See also Morgan's La. & Tex. Ry. & S.S. Co. v.
Himalaya Planting & Mfg. Co., 143 La. 460, 78 So. 735 (1918). Several cases,
however, seem to indicate that a vendor's lien is lost only in connection with
things immobilized under Article 464. Thus, as to things immobilized under
Article 467, the vendor's lien is preserved. See Comment, Immovables by Nature
under Article 467, 20 LouISIANA LAW REVIEW 410, 415, 416 (1960). Cf. Infra
text at note 154.
82. See Louisiana Ry. & Nay. Co. v. Cash Grocery & Sales Co., 150 So. 57
(La. App. 1st Cir. 1933). See also supra notes 56, 81; infra notes 157, 177.
83. See Lighting Fixtures Supply Co. v. Pacific Fire Ins. Co., 176 La. 449,
146 So. 35 (1932). See also Buchler v. Fourroux, 193 La. 445, 477, 190 So. 640,
650 (1939) : "[T]here is a vast distinction between immovables by destination
and immovables by nature. The status of an immovable by destination can be
changed by an act of the landowner, but there is no provision of law that we are
aware of, and none has been cited to that effect, that the act of the landowner,
or any other person, can change the status of an immovable by nature. . . . The
status of an immovable by nature is never changed by any act of the owner, while
the status of an immovable by destination changes according to its use by the
owner."
84. See D. XIV tit. 1, fr. 13-18; XXXIII tit. 7.
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inseparable from the soil, acquired its juridical nature.85 Finally,
the redactors of the French Civil Code went one step further
and introduced the distinction between things immovable by
nature and immovable by destination. 6 In Louisiana, this dis-
tinction figured in the Code of 1808.87 The category of things
immovable by destination has been termed "the most useless
construct of modern law." 8 Indeed, a provision declaring that
accessories of lands and buildings destined to their exploitation
and improvement should not be susceptible of separate owner-
ship and other real rights would amply serve the policy under-
lying immobilization. This is the technique employed in a num-
ber of modern civil codes.8 9
(1) Conditions for immobilizwtion. Articles 468 and 469
furnish criteria for the determination of the issue of immobili-
zation. According to Article 468 things "which the owner of a
tract of land has placed upon it for its service and improve-
ment" are immovable by destination. The rule is illustrated by
reference to "cattle intended for cultivation. Implements of
husbandry. Seeds, plants, fodder, and manure. Pigeons in a
pigeon house. Beehives. Mills, kettles, alembics, vats, and other
machinery made use of in carrying on the planatation works.
The utensils necessary for working cotton, and sawmills, taffia
distilleries, sugar refineries and other manufactures." The last
paragraph of the same article declares that "all such movables
as the owner has attached permanently to the tenement or to
the building, are likewise immovable by destination. '" 90 The fol-
lowing Article 469 declares that "the owner is supposed to have
attached to his tenement or building for ever such movables
85. See BOUTILLER, SOMME RURAL, tit. 74; GRAND CouTUMna, Bk. II, Chap.
18; COQUILLE, INSTITUTION AU DROIT DES FRANQAIS 96 (1666). Of. 3 PLANIOL
ET RIPERT, TRAITt PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANCAIS 79 (2d ed. 1952).
86. See 3 PLANIOL ET RUPERT, TRAITt PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANgAIS 79
(2d ed. 1952).
87. LA. CIVIL CODE p. 96, arts. 14, 20-21 (1808).
88. 3 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TRAITt PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANCAIS 80 (2d
ed. 1952). Immobilization by destination is unknown in the converse situation
where immovables might be regarded as accessory and dependent on a movable.
Thus, a real mortgage attached to an obligation (a movable right) does not lose
its juridical nature as immovable. The law did not create the category of things
movable by destination. Of. LOUISIANA CIVIL CODE art. 3284 (1870) : "The mort-
gage is accessory to a principal obligation which it is designed to strengthen, and
of which it is to secure the execution."
89. See, e.g., GERMAN CIVIL CODE arts. 93, 94; GREEK CIVIL CODE arts. 954,
956.
90. Of. LA. CIvIL CODE art. 459 (1825) ; LA. CIVIL CODz p. 98, art. 20 (1808).
It is settled that the list in Article 468 is merely indicative. See Scovel v. Shady-
side Co., 137 La. 918, 69 So. 745 (1915) ; Breaux v. Ganucheau, 3 La. App. 481
(1st Cir. 1925).
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as are affixed to the same with plaster, or mortar, or as can not
be taken off without being broken or injured, or without break-
ing or injuring the part of the building to which they are at-
tached." 91 The interpretation of these two articles involves a
number of interesting questions.
"By the owner"
Articles 468 and 469 declare that, for effective immobiliza-
tion by destination, the movables concerned must be placed in
position "by the owner." The courts have held consistently that
immobilization by destination may occur only where the owner
of a tract of land or building places on the premises things also
owned by him. 2 Personal action is not necessary; action on
behalf of the owner will suffice.98 Thus, "improvements" made
by a tenant,9 a hot water heater placed on the premises by a
lessee, 95 and an automatic sprinkler systems' or railroad tracks97
installed by persons other than the owner of the land, remain
movable.
91. Cf. LA. CIvIr. CODE art. 460 (1825) ; LA. CIVIL CODE p. 98, art. 21 (1808).
92. See Richardson v. Item Co., 172 La. 421, 134 So. 380, 381 (1931) ("A
movable becomes an immovable by destination when the owner unites it with
lands, tenements, or buildings which are also owned by him, with the intention
that the movables shall henceforth be merged and associated with the destiny of
the realty") ; Scovel v. Shadyside Co., 137 La. 918, 69 So. 745 (1915) ; Hibernia
National Bank v. Sarah Planting and Refining Co., 107 La. 650, 31 So. 1031
(1902) ; State v. Mekican Gulf Co., 3 Rob. 513 (La. 1843) ; Folse v. Loreauville
Sugar Factory, 156 So. 667 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1934) ; Buckley v. Lindsay Mer-
cantile Co., 5 La. App. 467 (2d Cir. 1927). Cf. Jones v. Conrad, 154 La. 860, 98
So. 397 (1924) (water pump placed by the owner became immovable by destina-
tion). The requirement that things be placed "by the owner" does not apply to
buildings and other structures under Article 464. See Lighting Fixture Supply
Co. v. Pacific Fire Ins. Co., 176 La. 499, 146 So. 35 (1933). Movables attached
by the husband, as head of the community, to the plantation of his wife are not
placed by the owner and do not become immovable by destination. See Hall v.
Wyche, 31 La. Ann. 734 (1879).
93. See Holicer Gas Co. v. Wilson, 45 So.2d 96, 100 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1950).
The case has been overruled on other grounds. See supra note 65.
94. See Henry v. Tricou, 2 McGloin 79 (La. 1884). See also Richardson v.
Item Co., 172 La. 421, 424, 134 So. 380, 381 (1931) : "For a movable to become
an immovable by destination it must necessarily be placed upon or attached to
the immovable by the owner himself. When such things are placed upon an im-
movable by a lessee as an improvement or addition, they remain movables." But
of. Lighting Fixture Supply Co. v. Pacific Fire Ins. Co., 176 La. 499, 510, 146
So. 35, 38 (1933) : "[According to the plain declaration of article 464 of the
Civil Code, the alterations and improvements made by the lessee to the leased
premises were immovables."
95. See Appel v. Ennis, 34 So.2d 415 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1948).
96. See Richardson v. Item Co., 172 La. 421, 134 So. 380 (1931) (decision
based in part on Article 2726 of the Civil Code).
97. See State v. Mexican Gulf Co., 3 Rob. 513 (La. 1843) ; suprG note 75.
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"Service and improvement"
Article 468 seems to contemplate that the tests of service and
improvement and that of permanent attachment are independ-
ent of each other. The first, in context, seems to apply to tracts
of land and the second to apply to tenements or buildings. In-
deed, the last paragraph of Article 468 may be taken to mean
that "the preceding declarations, though apparently broad
enough to include anything placed on a tract of land, in any
manner, by the owner of the land, for its service and improve-
ment ... was not intended to include movables which the owner
has attached 'to the tenement or to the building', and which be-
come immovable by destination only when attached 'permanent-
ly' to such 'tenement' or 'building'." 98 Today, it is settled in
Louisiana that the test of service and improvement is not con-
fined to tracts of land alone; it applies as well to tenements and
buildings. Proof of permanent attachment, therefore, may be
avoided. In the leading case of Straus v. New Orleans,99 the
Louisiana Supreme Court declared that the first paragraph of
Article 468 necessarily refers to industrial establishments since
"the illustrations given in the subsequent paragraphs are made
up of two distinct classes of things which thus become immov-
able by destination, viz., (1) those which are used in the culti-
vation and exploitation of lands; and (2) those which are used
in the operation of manufacturing establishments, such as cotton
mills, sawmills, taffia or rum distilleries, sugar refineries, 'and
other manufacturers'."' 10 This interpretation has been fortified
by reference to the legislative history of Article 468. The provi-
98. Scovel v. Shadyside Co., 137 La. 918, 927, 69 So. 745, 749 (1915).
99. 166 La. 1035, 1049, 118 So. 125, 130 (1928).
100. See also Bank of Lecompte v. Lecompte Cotton Oil Co., 125 La. 844, 51
So. 1010 (1910) ; Maginnis v. Union Oil Co., 47 La. Ann. 1489, 18 So. 459
(1895) ; Choate Oil Corp. v. Glassel, 153 La. 715, 96 So. 543 (1922) ; Comment,
lmmovables by Destination, 5 TUL. L. REV. 90, 98 (1930). La. Acts 1904, No.
187, LA. R.S. 9:1104 (1950), provides that one may establish by a recorded
declaration for purposes of mortgage and sale, "as being immovable by destina-
tion the machinery and appliances owned by him and used in a manufacturing or
industrial establishment located on his land." Apparently, the purpose of the act
was to classify machinery in industrial plants as immovable by destination, for
purposes of mortgage and sale, only when the intention of the owner is declared
and recorded. Cf. SAUNDERS, LECTURES ON THE CIVIL CODE 160 (1925). How-
ever, it has been held repeatedly that immobilization may occur in accordance
with the tests established by Articles 468 and 469 of the Civil Code, even though
the statute is not complied with. Thus the only effect of the statute is that the
party claiming immobilization is relieved of the burden of proving it in case of
compliance with the statute. See Bank of Lecompte v. Lecompte Cotton Oil Co.,
aupra; Willis v. Thompson, 1 La. App. 313 (2d Cir. 1924) ; Breaux v. Ganucheau,
3 La. App. 481 (1st Cir. 1925) ; Straus v. New Orleans, 166 La. 1035, 118 So.
125 (1928).
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sion first appeared in the Code of 1808,101 and was reproduced
in the Civil Code of 1825 as Article 459.102 In the French text
of the Louisiana Code, the word corresponding to tracts of land
is "fonds."'03 This word means, ordinarily, "landed property. 10,
Accordingly, the Louisiana Supreme Court declared that "inas-
much as the word 'fonds' in the French text of article 459 of
the Code of 1825, includes the meaning of-and means some-
thing more than-the phrase, 'a tract of land', in Article 468
of the Revised Civil Code, we must adopt the most enlarged
meaning." 0 5
The French Civil Code and the French text of the Louisiana
Civil Code seem to limit immobilization to agricultural and in-
dustrial exploitation of immovables. 0 6 The French courts, how-
ever, expanded the scope of the relevant provisions to include,
101. LA. CIVIL CODE p. 98, art. 20 (1808). See also Straus v. New Orleans,
166 La. 1035, 118 So. 125, 131 (1928) : "The French version of these articles of
which the original translation is retained in the Revised Civil Code are as
authoritative as the corresponding articles of the Revised Civil Code."
102. See also Straus v. New Orleans, 166 La. 1035, 1050-51, 118 So. 125,
130 (1928) : "The compilers of the Louisiana Code of 1825, in speaking of the
movable effects that became immovable by being affixed permanently to an im-
movable, as with plaster or cement, used the French word 'fonds' somewhat in-
differently -sometimes as meaning land only, and sometimes as meaning real
estate, consisting of either land or a building. In copying the last paragraph of
article 524 of the French Code, where the word 'fonds' alone is used to describe
the real estate, in the declaration that all of the movable effects which the pro-
prietor has attached permanently to the real estate 'fonds' are likewise immovable
by destination, the redactors of the Louiisana Code added the words, 'ou au
batiment' - meaning 'or to the building'. A literal translation of that paragraph
of article 459 of the Louisiana Code, therefore, is that all of the movable effects
which the proprietor has attached permanently to the land or building are likewise
immovable by destination; but, strange to say, in their translation of it into
English, the redactors translated the word 'fonds' as meaning tenement."
103. See Straus v. New Orleans, 166 La. 1035, 1050, 118 So. 125, 131 (1928)
"In the French text of the Louisiana Code, as in the Code Napoleon, the word
which was translated into 'a tract of land' is the French word 'fonds'." The
court also observed correctly that "Where the word 'fonds' alone is used in the
French Code, the words 'fonds on batiment' (land or building) are used in the
Code of 1825, and the words 'tenement or building' are used in the translation,
and, again, where the word 'fonds', alone, is used in the French Code, the words
'du batiment on fonds' are used in the Code of 1825, and the word 'building'
alone, is used in the translation."
104. In Straus v. New Orleans, 166 La. 1035, 1050, 118 So. 125, 130 (1928),
the court pointed out correctly that the word fonds "has no exact synonym in
English" and that its use "is not confined to land or ground, but may mean
landed property . .. real estate, including buildings on the land." Perhaps, in
absence of a correct synonym in English, the Latin word fundus could be used to
translate the French word fonds. See Breaux v. Ganucheau, 3 La. App. 481
(1st Cir. 1925) ("interest and utility of fundus") ; Edwards v. S. & R. Gas Co.,
73 So.2d 590, 592 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1954) ("service of the fundus").
105. Straus v. New Orleans, 166 La. 1035, 1051, 118 So. 125, 131 (1928). Cf.
Morton Trust Co. v. American Salt Co., 149 Fed. 540 (E.D. La. 1906).
106. See FRENCH CIVIL CODE art. 524; LA. CIVIL CODE art. 459 (1825).
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in addition to agricultural and industrial, commercial and resi-
dential exploitation. 10 7 The English text of the Louisiana Civil
Code does not leave room for such distinctions, and it seems to
be settled that the specific destination of the immovable is im-
material.108
In applying the test of service and improvement, Louisiana
courts frequently insist that the things placed on the premises
not be there merely for the service of the occupant. 09 It would
seem that this criterion should be relevant only in connection
with immovables by nature under Article 467.110 In the case of
Day v. Coff,111 the court found that office equipment was not
for the service and improvement of the immovable but for the
personal convenience of the occupants. Similarly, a hot water
107. See 3 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TRAITt PRATIQUE DE DROIT CML FRANQAIS
88-90 (2d ed. 1952).
108. See Zengel, Elements of the Law of Ownership, in 3 WEST's LSA-CIvmL
CODE 23 (1950). The English text of Article 468 uses the expression "service and
improvement" rather than "service and exploitation" (service et exploitation in
the French text of Article 459 of the 1825 Code). Of. Bank of Lecompte v.
Lecompte Cotton Oil Co., 125 La. 844, 51 So. 1010 (1910). Application of
Article 468 to residential destination of immovables was questioned in Scovel v.
Shadyside Co., 137 La. 918, 69 So. 745 (1915). See also L'Hote v. Fulham, 51
La. Ann. 780, 25 So. 655 (1890) ; Dixie Building Material Co. v. Chartier, 8 La.
App. 469 (Or. Cir. 1928) (the court apparently assuming that the test of
"service and improvement" does not apply to residential destination). It has been
also observed that almost all decisions involving immobilization by destination
in residences are founded on permanent attachment under Article 469. See Com-
ment, Immovables by Destination, 5 TUL. L. REV. 90, 101, n. 35 (1930) ; Note,
LOUISIANA LAw REVIEW 429, 430 (1947). Broad language indicating the possi-
bility of application of Article 468(1) to residential destination of immovables
was used in Straus v. New Orleans, 166 La. 1035, 118 So. 125 (1928). In a
subsequent case, Kelieher v. Gravois, 26 So.2d 304 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1946), the
court conceded applicability of Article 468(1) to residences. However, certain
venetian blinds were held to be movable as serving the convenience of the oc-
cupants rather than destined to the service and improvement of the immovable.
Application of Article 468(1) to commercial destination of immovables seemed
to be a relevant question in Day v. Goff, 2 La. App. 75 (2d Cir. 1925). The
court, however, avoided this question by a finding that the movables in question
served the convenience of the business conducted in the building rather than the
building itself. This holding is in line with French authorities. Indeed, in France,
the test of "service and improvement" applies to industrial and commercial estab-
lishments housed in buildings erected for these particular purposes. See Comment,
Immovables by Destination, 5 TUL. L. REv. 90, 100 (1930).
109. See Morton Trust Co. v. American Salt Co., 149 Fed. 540, 543 (E.D.
La. 1906): "The movable in order to become immobilized, must be employed in
the service of the fundus, and not in the service of the person who owns the
fundus." See also note 108 supra.
110. Article 467 uses the expression "use or convenience of the building." No
reference to convenience is made in either Article 468 or 469. Cf. text at note 68
supra.
111.-2 La. App. 75, 79 (2d Cir. 1925). See also Campbell v. Hammond Box
and Veneer Co., 167 So. 111 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1936) (office equipment in manu-
facturing plant did not become immovable by destination).
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heater, 112 a Ford roadster and a horse," s trucks and cars, 114 and
a mare not intended for use in cultivation" 5 have all been held
to be movables serving the convenience of the occupants of lands
or buildings. On the other hand, a dough-mixer in a bakery, 116
a butane gas tank,"7 and a water pump" 8 have been regarded
as "improvements," and, therefore, immovable by destination.
Ordinarily, things necessary for carrying out business are
regarded as dedicated to the service and improvement of the
premises. Thus, machinery necessary for the operation and
development of a mineral lease"19 has been treated as immovable
by destination; similarly, all property "used in carrying out the
industry to which the real estate was subjected" has been re-
garded as effectively immobilized. 20 Things "accessory and de-
pendent" are also within the scope of service and improvement.
Thus, a servitude has been held an immovable by destination
as accessory to a plantation, and a tramway laid on the servi-
tude, as accessory and dependent on the servitude.' 21 Finally,
machinery in a sugar factory has been found to be immovable
by destination and an "improvement" by reference to economic
considerations.122 When a movable "ceases to be of service to
a tract of land,' 123 immobilization terminates. Likewise, mov-
112. See Baldwin v. Young, 47 La. Ann. 1466, 17 So. 883 (1895). This de-
cision "was, in effect, overruled so far as it sustained the validity of conditional
sales in this state, but not so far as it sustained the right of an unpaid vendor
to enforce his privilege on the movable sold, notwithstanding by the act of the
vendee it has become part of an immovable." Caldwell v. Laurel Grove Co., 175
La. 928, 936, 144 So. 718, 720 (1932). See also Appel v. Ennis, 34 So.2d 415
(La. App. Orl. Cir. 1948).
113. See Choate Oil Corp. v. Glassel, 153 La. 715, 96 So. 543 (1923).
114. See Willis v. Thomason, 1 La. App. 313 (2d Cir. 1924).
115. Lapene v. McCan, 28 La. Ann. 749 (1876). Cf. Morton Trust Co. v.
American Salt Co., 149 Fed. 540, 543 (5th Cir. 1906).
116. See Breaux v. Ganucheau, 3 La. App. 481 (1st Cir. 1925).
117. See Holicer Gas Co. v. Wilson, 45 So.2d 96 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1950), dis-
cussed supra note 65.
118. See Jones v. Conrad, 154 La. 860, 98 So. 397 (1923).
119. See Choate Oil Corp. v. Glassel, 153 La. 715, 96 So. 543 (1923). See also
Bass v. Southern States Bottle Co., 17 La. App. 304, 136 So. 159 (2d Cir. 1931) ;
Bank of Winnfield v. Olla State Bank, 11 La. App. 640, 124 So. 621 (2d Cir.
1929).
120. Rochereau v. Bobb, 27 La. Ann. 657, 658 (1875). See also Succession
of Allen, 48 La. Ann. 1036, 20 So. 193 (1896).
121. Coguenhem v. Trosclair, 137 La. 985, 69 So. 800 (1915).
122. Swoop v. St. Martin, 110 La. 237, 34 So. 426 (1903) ; infra note 145.
The intention of the owner is apparently immaterial in connection with the test
of service and improvement. See Folse v. Triche, 113 La. 915, 918, 37 So. 875,
876 (1904) : "If such machinery be not incorporated with the building, but placed
therein for the service and improvement of the land, it becomes immovable by
destination, not because the owner so wills or intends, but by reason of such serv-
ice and improvement."
123. See Folse v. Triche, 113 La. 915, 917, 37 So. 875 (1904): "Movables
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ables which have not had the opportunity to become of service
to an immovable are not immobilized. 124
Permanent attachment.
In terms, the test of permanent attachment seems to apply
to "tenements or buildings" as an independent ground of im-
mobilization. Louisiana courts, however, tend in certain cases
to consolidate the test of permanent attachment with that of
service and improvement and apparently require that all con-
ditions must be met before a thing will be treated as an im-
movable by destination. 125 In France, courts interpreting the
corresponding provisions of the French Civil Code have reached
the conclusion that either test would suffice.126 This interpreta-
tion is preferable in the light of the text of the Civil Code.
It is not clear what constitutes permanent attachment. While
intention to immobilize may be material in some cases, it seems
clear that mere intention of the owner will not suffice. Some
overt act by the owner or on his behalf is always necessary. 2 7
In most instances, intention to immobilize is gathered from the
fact of permanent attachment.1 2  Permanent attachment does
not mean attachment for "perpetuity or eternity.'1 29 Further,
permanent attachment is distinguishable from the situation in
which a movable becomes incorporated into an immovable so
as to become a component part thereof. In that case, the movable
which do not perform this function do not fall within the terms of the definition.
Hence it would seem that when, from any cause, a movable ceases to be of service
to a tract of land, or is detached from a building or tenement of which it formed a
part as an accessory, there is no longer ground for the claim that such movable
appertains to the realty."
124. See Willis v. Thomason, 1 La. App. 313 (2d Cir. 1924) ; Nimmo v. Allen,
2 La. Ann. 451 (1847). See also Beard v. Duralde, 23 La. Ann. 284 (1871).
125. See Zengel, Elements of the Law of Ownership, in 3 WEST'S LSA-CIVIL
CODE 22 (1950) ; Comment, Immovables by Destination, 5 TUL. L. REV. 90, 104(1930). See also Scovel v. Shadyside Co., 137 La. 918, 69 So. 745 (1915) ; Holi-
cer Gas Co. v. Wilson, 45 So.2d 96 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1950) (butane gas tank
an immovable under Articles 464, 467, and 468). But cf. Bank of Lecompte v.
Lecompte Cotton Oil Co., 125 La. 844, 848, 51 So. 1010, 1011 (1910): "There
are two categories of immovables by destination-property attached to the realty,
and the other forming part of the realty for its exploitation." The court also in-
dicated that permanent attachment is unnecessary as to movables placed on thefonds for its service and improvement. See also Folse v. Triche, 113 La. 915, 37
So. 875 (1904).
126. See 3 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TnRAITP, PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANVAIS
84, 92 (2d ed. 1952).
127. Cf. Bon Air Planting Co. v. Barringer, 142 La. 60, 76 So. 234 (1917).
128. See Scovel v. Shadyside Co., 137 La. 918, 69 So. 745 (1915). It is clear
that the test of permanent attachment applies to all immovables, regardless of
destination. Cf. supra note 108.
129. Coguenhem v. Trosclair, 137 La. 985, 69 So. 800 (1915).
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becomes immovable by nature under Articles 464 or 467 rather
than immovable by destination.18 0 However, the courts have not
been always consistent in their interpretation and application
of Articles 468 and 469 in connection with the issue of per-
manent attachment. In some instances it is indicated that Ar-
ticle 469 furnishes the only possible method of permanent at-
tachment.181 In other instances, Article 469 is regarded as merely
illustrative of the methods which can be used. Thus, it has
been held that the cases specified in Article 469 do not limit
the general disposition contained in Article 468, and that "when
none of the presumptions established by article 469 exist, the
fact may be shown by any competent evidence.' 3 2 It is sub-
mitted that Articles 468 and 469 contemplate distinguishable
situations. Permanent attachment may be effected in several
ways and by different methods. 138 Where the methods of at-
tachment conform to the tests furnished by Article 469, the
intention of the owner is immaterial, and immobilization should
be considered proven. Where attachment is claimed apart from
Article 469, permanent attachment may still be proved by refer-
ence to the intention of the owner and overt acts indicating this
intention.
The courts, quite frequently, determine the issue of per-
manent attachment by reference to the possibility of identifica-
tion and facility of removal of the movables concerned. Thus,
130. Cf. Monroe Auto & Supply Co. v. Cole, 6 La. App. 337 (2d Cir. 1927).
In that case the court found that a gas tank and other articles "had 'become
merged into the immovable and have become so far a part of it as to lose entirely
the character of movables."
131. See Day v. Goff, 2 La. App. 75, 79 (2d Cir. 1925) : "There is no pretence
that they [i.e. office furniture and supplies] are permanently attached to the
building either by plaster, mortar or in any other way which would prevent their
being taken off without breaking or injuring them or the building." See also
Richardson v. Item Co., 172 La. 421, 134 So. 380, 381 (1931) ; Dixie Bldg. Ma-
terial Co. v. Chartier, 8 La. App. 469 (Orl. Cir. 1928) ; L'Hote v. Fulham, 51
La. Ann. 780, 25 So. 655 (1899).
132. Scovel v. Shadyside Co., 137 La. 918, 922, 69 So. 745, 746 (1915):
"Article 469 provides that all such movables as the owner has placed for the
service and improvement of the land and those which are attached permanently
to the building are immovable by destination; it embraces all cases in which the
movable has been placed by the owner ad intergrandum domun; and, when none
of the presumptions established by article 468 exist, the fact may be shown by
any competent evidence." See also Mackie v. Smith, 5 La. Ann. 717 (1850) (un-
der the corresponding provisions of the 1825 Code).
133. See SAUNDERS, LECTURES ON THE CIVIL CODE 159 (1925) : "There have
been a great many controversies as to what connection may be deemed permanent.
One thing is certain, that what the Code says on the subject (469) is by way of
explanation only. When the Code says whatever is connected by plaster or by
mortar is a part of it, it is only an illustration of the permanent union between the
thing and the house, and it admits of other methods of union which will be deemed
'to be permanent."
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if things are identifiable, and easily removable, like refrigera-
tion equipment in a building, 184 machinery in a sugar factory, 8 5
an ice crusher,13 an oil burner,187 a soda fountain in a drug
store, 18s and chandeliers' 9 in a residence, immobilization by
destination does not occur. On the other hand, things which
are identifiable but not easily removable are said to become
immovable by destination. It has been so held in cases involving
a gas tank, 14 certain valuable mirrors,' 4' a safe,142 and chan-
deliers in a residence. 43 Possibility of identification and facility
of removal should not be and are not always controlling con-
siderations.'4 4 In one case, identifiable pieces of machinery in
a sugar factory, though easily removable, were declared to be
immovable by destination because of economic considerations.
If removed, these pieces of machinery would have become scrap
iron to the detriment of all concerned.'4 5 And in another case,
a pumping plant for irrigation of rice fields, though identifiable
and easily removable, was found to have become immovable by
134. Hamilton Co. v. Medical Arts Bldg. Co., 17 La. App. 508, 135 So. 94
(2d Cir. 1931). See also Baldwin v. Joung, 47 La. Ann. 1466, 17 So. 883 (1895)
(heater "detachable without injury") ; supra note 112.
135. Folse v. Loreauville Sugar Factory, 156 So. 667 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1934).
See also Garlin v. Gordy, 32 La. Ann. 1285 (1880) ; Lapene v. McCan, 28 La.
Ann. 749 (1876).
136. Cristina Inv. Corp. v. Gulf Ice Co., 55 So. 2d 685 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1952).
137. Succession of Sussman, 168 La. 349, 122 So. 62 (1929).
138. Liquid Carbonic Corp. v. Crow, 177 La. 379, 148 So. 442 (1933).
139. McGuigin v. Boyle, 1 Orl. App. 164 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1904). See also
L'Hote v. Fulham, 51 La. Ann. 780, 25 So. 655 (1899). The L'Hote case was
8istinguished in Scovel v. Shadyside Co., 137 La. 918, 925, 69 So. 745, 747 (1915),
also involving chandeliers, on the ground that in L'Hote they were "placed with
direct reference to the facility of detaching and removing."
140. Holicer Gas Co. v. Wilson, 45 So.2d 96 (La. App. 1950) ; But cf. eupre
note 65.
141. Mackie v. Smith, 5 La. Ann. 717 (1850).
142. Folger v. Kenner, 24 La. Ann. 436 (1872).
143. Scovel v. Shadyside Co., 137 La. 918, 69 So. 745 (1915).
144. See Monroe Auto & Supply Co. v. Cole, 6 La. App. 337 (2d Cir. 1927).
Of. SAUNDERS, LECTURES ON THE CIVIL CODE 158 (1925) : "The vendor of ma-
chinery in many cases sells only a part of the complex machinery of a sugar
plantation or refinery, and the part that he sells is merged and intermingled with
other parts of the intricate machinery supplied -by other parties, and if he were
to take out the separate part that he sold he would inflict an injury on these other
vendors greater than the benefit he would himself derive by separating the parts
and recovering in that way."
145. Swoop v. St. Martin, 110 La. 237, 34 So. 426 (1903). See also Hibernia
Bank & Trust Co. v. Knoll Planting & Mfg. Co., 133 La. 697, 63 So. 288
(1913); Milliken & Farwell v. Roger, 138 La. 823, 70 So. 848 (1916) (the
court after directing attention to the significance of the difference in the original
cost of the materials and the amount they realized at the sheriff's sale as showing
their loss of character as things of commerce, rejected the claim for a vendor's
privilege). These cases "must be considered overruled" insofar as they are incon-
sistent with Louisiana jurisprudence tending to preserve a vendor's lien. Caldwell
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destination. 146 On the other hand, identifiable pieces of ma-
chinery in a sugar factory, though not easily removable, were
treated as movable. 147
For a thing to become immovable by destination under the
last paragraph of Article 468 it is not necessary that it be placed
by the owner "upon" the land or building. It suffices that it is
"attached" thereto; and this attachment need not be physical.148
Thus, a servitude may be attached to a plantation, and a tram-
way may be attached to the servitude. 149 This seems to imply
the possibility of immobilization even where land ownership
does not coincide with the ownership of the movables. Actually,
it indicates that things placed on the land of another may at
times be regarded as accessories of immovables. This is a com-
mendable interpretation leading to equitable results in accord-
ance with the policy grounds for immobilization.
(2) Critique. Louisiana courts, in determining the question
whether a thing is movable or immovable, have encountered a
number of analytical difficulties which, in turn, have resulted
in seemingly inconsistent determinations. In several instances,
courts felt almost compelled to declare that the issue of im-
mobilization should be determined as a fact."50 It is submitted,
however, that the Code provides general criteria for this deter-
mination and that Louisiana jurisprudence permits rational
analysis. The seemingly conflicting decisions could be reconciled
by a realistic analysis of the issues involved in each case.
The issue of immobilization arises, ordinarily, in cases in-
volving claims for acquisition or loss of rights as a result of a
close association of a movable with an immovable. This associa-
tion may take one of two forms: The movable may lose its in-
v. Laurel Grove Co., 175 La. 928, 941, 144 So. 718, 722 (1932).
146. Pan-American Life Ins. Co. v. Reynaud, 4 La. App. 290 (lst Cir. 1926).
147. Receivership of Augusta Co., 134 La. 971, 64 So. 870 (1914). See also
Pratt ]E. & M. Co. v. Cecelia Sugar Co., 135 La. 179, 65 So. 100 (1914).
148. "The requirement of the Code [Article 468] is not necessarily that the
movables be 'upon' the tenement, but it suffices that they be 'attached' thereto;
and, of course, this attachment need not be physical." Coguenhem v. Trosclair,
137 La. 985, 993, 69 So. 800, 803 (1915). But see Comment, Immovables by
Destination, 5 TuL. L. REv. 90, 104 (1930).
149. Coguenhem v. Trosclair, 137 La. 985, 69 So. 800 (1915). See also New
Orleans, Spanish Fort & Lake R.R. Co. v. Delamore, 34 La. Ann. 1225 (1882)
(a pavilion connected with plaintiff's land and for its exclusive use, though not
on plaintiff's land but upon the land of another person, was an accessory).
150. See, e.g., Receivership of Augusta Co., 134 La. 971, 64 So. 870 (1914);
Swoop v. St. Martin, 110 La. 237, 34 So. 426 (1903).
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dividuality and may become a component part of an immovable
(immovable by nature) or it may retain its individuality despite
close association with the immovable (immovable by destina-
tion). In the first, the movable should not be susceptible of
separate ownership rights and should follow, almost always, the
ownership of the immovable. In the second, the movable should,
in principle, be susceptible of separate ownership. The question
is under which circumstances should rights established on the
immovable be extended to include the movable or in which in-
stances should the movable follow the ownership of the immov-
able. This question arises, particularly, in cases involving ven-
dor's liens, mortgages, sales, and relations between landowners
and persons establishing improvements on the premises. Deter-
mination of the issue of immobilization in each of these dis-
tinguishable situations may be made by reference to different
considerations. Consequently, a judicial finding that certain
things are movables or immovables in these cases is, ordinarily,
the statement of a conclusion reached on other grounds.
Vendors' liens.
The issue of immobilization is frequently raised as an answer
to a vendor's claim for a lien on movables. Apparently, it was
once assumed that as to movables immobilized by nature or by
destination vendors' liens were extinguished. Thus, in order to
protect vendors' interests, certain courts have been reluctant to
find that the objects in question became immovables. 151 Other
courts, however, have declared that vendors' liens were pre-
served even though the particular objects became immovable
by destination 15 2 or by nature.15 According to these holdings,
151. Succession of Sussman, 168 La. 349, 122 So. 62 (1929) (oil burner);
Cristina Inv. Corp. v. Gulf Ice Co., 55 So.2d 685 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1952) (ice
crusher). Cf. Pan-American Life Ins. Co. v. Reynaud, 4 La. App. 290 (1st Cir.
1926) (materials immobilized; lien lost).
152. Receivership of Augusta Co., 134 La. 971, 64 So. 870 (1914) ; Hibernia
National Bank v. Sarah Planting and Refining Co., 107 La. 650, 31 So. 1031
(1901) ; Walburn-Swenson Co. v. Darrell, 49 La. Ann. 1044, 22 So. 310 (1897) ;
Carlin v. Gordy, 32 La. Ann. 1285 (1880) ; Hamilton Co. v. Medical Arts Bldg.
Co., 17 La. App. 508, 135 So. 94 (2d Cir. 1931). Cf. Shelly v. Winder, 36 La.
Ann. 182 (1884).
153. Tangipahoa Bank & Trust Co. v. Kent, 70 F.2d 139 (5th Cir. 1934), 9
TUL. L. REV. 282 (1935) ; Cottonport Bank v. Dunn, 21 So.2d 525 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1945) ; Davis-Wood Lumber Co. v. Ins. Co. of North America, 154 So.
760 (Ia. App. 1st Cir. 1934) (the court seemed to indicate that a vendor's lien
on materials used in the construction of a house was not lost by incorporation).
But see Monroe Auto & Supply Co. v. Cole, 6 La. App. 337 (2d Cir. 1927) (ven-
dor's lien lost with regard to things immobilized by nature) ; Comment, Immov-
ables by Destination, 5 TUL. L. Rav. 90, 103, n. 38 (1930).
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the issue of immobilization becomes immaterial in connection
with vendors' liens: whether liens are preserved or lost is de-
cided on other grounds. In that regard, distinction should be
made between cases involving vendors and vendees or their
successors in title and those involving third parties. In the rela-
tions between vendors and vendees facility of removal and pos-
sibility of identification of the things concerned seem to be
determinative. If these tests are met, the lien is preserved.1 4
In a leading case, the Louisiana Supreme Court held that pos-
sibility of identification alone suffices; facility of removal
should be immaterial. 15 When the things are no longer identi-
fiable, and, according to some cases, when the things cannot be
removed without excessive expense or effort,156 the lien is lost.
In the event of transfer of the immovable with its immobilized
accessories to third parties of good faith the lien is lost.1 57 The
vendor may protect his interests by recordation" 5 or by inter-
vention' 59 prior to the transfer.
154. See Cristina Inv. Corp. v. Gulf Ice Co., 55 So.2d 685 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1951 (ice crusher) ; Cottonport Bank v. Dunn, 21 So.2d 525 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1945); Hamilton Co. v. Medical Arts Bldg. Co., 17 La. App. 508, 135 So. 94
(2d Cir. 1931) ; Lapene v. McCan, 28 La. Ann. 749 (1876). See also Baldwin v.
Young, 47 La. Ann. 1466, 17 So. 883 (1895).
155. Receivership of Augusta Co., 134 La. 971, 64 So. 870 (1914) (vendor's
lien preserved although pieces of machinery could not be detached without dis-
abling factory). See also Pratt E. & M. Co. v. Cecelia Sugar Co., 135 La. 179,
65 So. 100 (1914) ; Caldwell v. Laurel Grove Co., 175 La. 928, 144 So. 718 (1932)
(railroad tracks) ; Tangipahoa Bank & Trust Co. v. Kent, 70 F.2d 139 (5th Cir.
1934. But cf. Monroe Auto & Supply Co. v. Cole, 6 Ia. App. 337 (2d Cir.
1927) ; "Doors, window sash and blinds could easily be identified by the vendor,
but he loses his privilege on them when used in the construction of a building,
even though susceptible of identification"; supra note 147.
156. See supra note 145; Comment, Immovables by Destination, 5 TUL. L.
RzV. 90, 103, n. 38 (1930).
157. See LA. CIVIL CODE art. 3228 (1870) ; Citizens' Bank v. Bellamy Lum-
ber Co., 140 La. 497, 73 So. 308 (1916) ; Dreyfous v. Cade, 138 La. 297, 70 So.
231 (1915) ; Davis-Wood Lumber Co. v. Insurance Co. of North America, 154
So. 760 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1934) ; Hamilton Co. v. Medical Arts Bldg. Co., 17
La. App. 508, 135 So. 94 (2d Cir. 1931) ; Pan-American Life Ins. Co. v. Reynaud,
4 La. App. 290 (1st Cir. 1926). The rule does not apply where ownership of the
movable is reserved. See Louisiana Ry. & Nay. Co. v. Cash Grocery & Sales Co.,
150 So. 57 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1933). The lien is also preserved in case of seizure
or sale of the immovable by creditors of the landowner. See Shelly v. Winder,
36 La. Ann. 182 (1884) ; Caldwell v. Laurel Grove Co., 175 La. 928, 144 So.
718 (1932).
158. Hearne v. Victoria Lbr. Co. 131 La. 646, 60 So. 22 (1912) (recorded
lien passes with the property) ; Carlin v. Gordy, 32 La. Ann. 1285 (1880) (ma-
terials immobilized but vendor's lien preserved). Recordation is unnecessary where
title to the movable is claimed by creditors of the landowner. Caldwell v. Laurel
Grove Co., 175 La. 928, 144 So. 718 (1932). Recordation is also unnecessary
where ownership of the movable is reserved. Louisiana Ry. & Nay. Co. v. Cash
Grocery & Sales Co., 150 So. 57 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1933).
159. Pan-American Life Ins. Co. v. Reynaud, 4 La. App. 290 (1st Cir. 1926);
Tangipahoa Bank & Trust Co. v. Kent, 70 F. 2d 139 (5th Cir. 1934).
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A few final observations may be in point. Perhaps the law
should distinguish between instances involving immovables by
nature and immovables by destination. It would seem that, with
regard to the former, the vendor's lien, as a distinct real right,
should be lost; as a procedural privilege, it could persist.10 But
with regard to immovables by destination there is no reason
why a vendor's lien both as a real right and a procedural privi-
lege should not be preserved against the vendee and his succes-
sors in title always and against third parties if recorded.' 6 '
Mortgage, sale, and other tranfers.
Question frequently arises as to which movables, not men-
tioned specifically, are covered by a real mortgage or included
in the transfer of title to an immovable. The general rule seems
to be that a real mortgage extends to movables immobilized by
nature or by destination 62 and that these things follow the
160. Of. supra note 81.
161. Cf. LA. R.S. 9: 5357 (1950).
162. See, e.g., Coguenhem v. Trosclair, 137 La. 985, 69 So. 800 (1915) (servi-
tude and tramway) ; Borah & Landen v. O'Neill, 121 La. 733 (1908) (mules and
implements in plantation) ; New Orleans Canal & Banking Co. v. Leeds & Co.,
49 La. Ann. 123, 21 So. 168 (1896) (materials in foundry) ; Breaux v. Ganu-
cheau, 3 La. App. 481 (1st Cir. 1925) (dough-mixer) ; Morton Trust Co. v.
American Salt Co., 149 Fed. 540 (E.D. La. 1906) (machinery and implements
in a salt mine). See also Citizens' Bank v. Bellamy Lumber Co., 140 La. 497,
73 So. 308 (1916) ; Dreyfous v. Cade, 138 La. 297, 70 So. 231 (1915) ; Brauds'
Sugars v. Williams Richardson Co., 15 La. App. 616, 132 So. 670 (1st Cir. 1931) ;
St. Mary Iron Works v. Community Mfg. Enterprise, 9 La. App. 743 (1st Cir.
1929) ; In re Liquidation of Union Planting & Mfg. Co., 10 La. App. 744, 121
So. 362 (Orl. Cir. 1929). The parties cannot validly contract that property ac-
quired in the future will be included in a real mortgage. See State of Louisiana
v. Atlas Pipeline Corp., 33 F. Supp. 160 (W.D. La. 1940); LA. CIVr COD,
arts. 3288, 3308 (1870). However, things placed on mortgaged land, if immobil-
ized by nature or destination, become subject to the mortgage. See Federal Land
Bank v. Cook, 179 La. 857, 155 So. 249 (1934) (a residence) ; Coltharp v.
West, 127 La. 430, 53 So. 675 (1910) (a residence) ; Weil v. Lapeyre, 38 La.
Ann. 303 (1886) (implements and improvements) ; Bass v. Southern States Bottle
Co., 17 La. App. 304, 136 So. 159 (2d Cir. 1931) (machinery in bottle factory) ;
Bank of Winnfield v. Olla State Bank, 11 La. App. 640, 124 So. 621 (2d Cir.
1929) (pumping rig in oil field). Cf. Campbell v. Hammond Box & Veneer Co.,
167 So. 111 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1936) (office furniture and equipment in manu-
facturing plant) ; Liquid Carbonic Corp. v. Crow, 177 La. 379, 148 So. 442 (1933)
(soda fountain). In order to have a herd of cattle included in a real mortgage
as immovable by destination, La. Acts 1914, No. 169, required that cattle be
"described as near as may be by kind, age, color, marks, brand and such other
indicia by which live stock is identified." Alliance Trust Co. v. Gueydan Bank,
162 La. 1062, 111 So. 421 (1927) ; Vidalia Bank & Trust Co. v. Purcell, 8 La.
App. 39 (2d Cir. 1928). La. Acts 1914, No. 169, is superseded by La. Acts 1934,
No. 199, LA. R.S. 9:5104 (1950) which provides that: "No mortgage placed on
rural real estate subsequent to July 22, 1934, shall affect the livestock and im-
plements of husbandry used in farming the property nor the machinery likewise
used and not permanently attached to the soil."
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ownership of the soil in all cases. 1 . 3 The finding that a par-
ticular object has become immobilized is thus determinative.
In that regard, the standard tests for immobilization are fre-
quently applied by the courts, with results not always consistent
if examined in the abstract.
Distinction, however, should be made between immovables
by nature and immovables by destination. It would seem that
a real mortgage and a transfer of an immovable should, ordi-
narily, include all accessories classified as immovable by nature.
These things form an economic unity with the ground and, in
principle, should not be susceptible of separate real rights. Party
intention should carry little weight; the law should not en-
courage separate ownership of the ground and its accessories.' M
The law, perhaps, should not recognize a mortgage on the ground
to the exclusion of buildings and improvements, or a real mort-
gage on buildings to the exclusion of the ground. 1 5 Reservation
of title by the vendor of an immovable to, or separate sale of,
things such as standing crops and buildings should necessarily
mean that these things are regarded as movables and sooner
or later should be removed from the ground. There is, no doubt,
then, that in this group of cases courts will be inclined to clas-
163. See Federal Land Bank v. Cook, 179 La. 857, 155 So. 249 (1934) (resi-
dence) ; Bass v. Southern States Bottle Co., 17 La App. 304, 136 So. 159 (2d
Cir. 1931) (machinery in bottle factory) ; Scott v. Brennan, 161 La. 1017, 109
So. 822 (1926) (hot water heater) ; Scovel v. Shadyside Co., 137 La. 918, 69
So. 745 (1915) (chandeliers, bathtubs, gas outfits, mantel pieces, grillwork);
Coguenhem v. Trosclair, 137 La. 985, 69 So. 800 (1915) (servitude and tram-
way) ; Hearne v. Victoria Lbr. Co., 131 La. 646, 60 So. 22 (1912) (materials
incorporated in building) ; Coltharp v. West, 127 La. 430, 53 So. 675 (1910)
(residence); Maginnis v. Union Oil Co., 47 La. Ann. 1489, 18 So. 459 (1895)
(machinery intended to be dismantled) ; Polhman v. DeBouchel, 32 La. Ann. 1158
(1880) (buildings and improvements); Lapene v. McCan, 28 La. Ann. 749
(1876) (utensils and animals on plantation) ; Folger v. Kenner, 24 La. Ann. 436
(1872) (a safe) ; Theurer v. Nautre, 23 La. Ann. 749 (1871) (machinery in
oil factory) ; Colligan v. Benoit, 13 La. App. 612, 128 So. 688 (1st Cir. 1930)
(standing crop) ; Mackie v. Smith, 5 La. Ann. 717 (1850) (mirrors). In a num-
ber of cases, however, movable things were held not to be included in the sale of
an immovable. See Liquid Carbonic Corp. v. Crow, 177 La. 379, 148 So. 442
(1933) (soda fountain) ; Willis v. Thomason, 1 La. App. 313 (2d Cir. 1924)
(car and trucks) ; McGuigin v. Boyle, 1 Orl. App. 164 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1904)
(chandeliers) ; Nimmo v. Allen, 2 La. Ann. 451 (1847) (corn, staves, building
materials) ; Key v. Woolfolk, 6 Rob. 424 (La. 1844) (bricks for sale) ; Edwards
v. S.&R. Gas Co., 73 So.2d 590 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1954) (butane gas tank);
Kelieher v. Gravois, 26 So.2d 304 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1946) (venetian blinds).
164. See Lighting Fixture Supply Co. v. Pacific Fire Insurance Co., 176 La.
499, 512, 146 So. 35, 39 (1933) : "It would seem anomalous if we should main-
tain that the office fixtures, shelving, mezzanine floor, and other so-called better-
ments and improvements placed by the lessee in the leased premises became im-
movable by nature, and yet remained the property of the lessee." (concurring
opinion 'by C. J. O'Niell). Of. Meyer v. Mathis, 42 La. Ann. 471, 7 So. 605 (1890)
(batture and alluvion are inseparable component parts of the ground).
165. 'Cf. Bank of Terrebonne v. Engeron, 140 So. 58 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1932).
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sify buildings and component parts thereof as immovables by
nature, and consider them as included in the acts of mortgage or
transfer.
Whether immovables by destination are covered by a real
mortgage or whether these are included in the transfer of an
immovable are issues which should be determined according to
considerations varying with the parties involved in litigation.
In the relations between mortgagor and mortgagee, or vendor
and vendee, and their successors in title, reference to party
intention may be determinative: immovables by destination are
susceptible of separate ownership and may be encumbered or
transferred separately from the ground. The rule that immov-
ables by destination follow the ground should be regarded as a
rule of interpretation, applicable in the absence of other party
intention. 16 The tests of immobilization in these cases may be
either service and improvement of the ground or building, or
permanent attachment, but as indicative of an intention that
certain movables should, according to the wish of the owner,
follow the immovable." 7 Where interests of third parties of
good faith are involved, objective considerations should control.
In the absence of specific mention in the recorded acts of mort-
gage or sale, courts very rarely decide that movables follow the
immovable as immobilized by destination. Typically, in contests
between mortgagees claiming title to movables as included in
the mortgage by virtue of Article 465 (1), and persons claiming
the same movables as purchasers of good faith,0 s as chattel-
mortgagees,16 9 or as having a vendor's lien,' 70 the courts decide
166. Of. Stanfa v. Bynum, 37 F. Supp. 962, 966 (W.D. La. 1941): "Article
464 is only applicable to contracts where parties have remained silent on the
character of the thing sold." See also Willis v. Thomason, 1 La. App. 313, 315
(2d Cir. 1924) : "The burden was on plaintiffs to show that the automobile and
trucks in question were included in the act of mortgage." Of. Prevot v. Courtney,
241 La. 313, 129 So.2d 1 (1961) ; Smith v. Bell, 224 La. 1, 68 So.2d 737 (1954).
167. See Scovel v. Shadyside Co., 137 La. 918, 921, 69 So. 745, 746 (1915)
(the "intention" of the owner was that certain movables "should be permanently
attached for the service and convenience of the house").
168. The claim of a purchaser in good faith, however, is not superior to that
of a chattel-mortgagee. Liquid Carbonic Corp. v. Crow, 177 La. 379, 148 So. 442
(1933).
169. Day v. Goff, 2 La. App. 75 (2d Cir. 1925) (office furniture and equip-
ment) ; Woodward v. American Exposition Ry., 39 La. Ann. 566 (1887). A sub-
sequent chattel mortgage was also upheld against the claim of a prior real mort-
gagee in Willis v. Thomason, 1 La. App. 313 (2d Cir. 1924) (automobile and
trucks). Today, the issue is controlled by LA. R.S. 9:5357 (1950). But cf. Bank
of Winnfield v. Olla State Bank, 11 La. App. 640, 124 So. 621 (2d Cir. 1929)
(real mortgage covers equipment immobilized by destination though subject to
chattel mortgage).
170. Caldwell v. Laurel Grove Co., 175 La. 928, 144 So. 718 (1932) ; Receiver-
[Vol. XXII
19621 MOVABLES AND IMMOVABLES
the issue of immobilization against the mortgagee. Similarly,
in contests between persons claiming an unrecorded vendor's
lien and the vendee of an immovable in good faith, the courts
afford protection to the vendee. 17'
Improvements by persons3 other than the landoumer.
Immobilization either by nature or by destination is fre-
quently invoked as determinative of the question of ownership
of buildings and improvements placed on the ground by persons
other than the landowner. In the past it was argued that owner-
ship of the ground carried with it all accessories regarded as
immovable by nature,172 and courts, in order to reach desirable
results, were inclined at times to stretch the tests of immobiliza-
tion. Fortunately, the issue of immobilization by nature under
Articles 464 and 465 may be regarded today as divorced from
the issue of ownership.'" Accordingly, persons growing crops
or erecting edifices are protected, and in their relations with
the landowner are regarded as owners of the crops gathered
or edifices erected. 174 But against third parties deriving title
from the landowner, these persons are protected only if their
title to the crops or buildings is recorded. 75 With regard to im-
movables by destination, the question as to what belongs to the
landowner and what to other persons is ordinarily a matter of
contractual interpretation.7 " In the absence of a governing con-
ship of Augusta Sugar Co., 134 La. 971, 64 So. 870 (1914) ; Shelly v. Winder,
36 La. Ann. 182 (1884) ; Carlin v. Gordy, 32 La. Ann. 1285 (1880) ; Cristina
Inv. Corp. v. Gulf Ice Co., 55 So.2d 685 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1951); Hamilton
Co. v. Medical Arts Bldg. Co., 17 La. App. 508, 135 So. 94 (1931). See also
Baldwin v. Young, 47 La. Ann. 1466, 17 So. 883 (1895). But cf. Swoop v. St.
Martin, 110 La. 237, 34 So. 426 (1903) ; Monroe Auto & Supply Co. v. Cole, 6
La. App. 337 (2d Cir. 1927). In that regard, it has been stated that the Louisiana
courts seem to disregard Article 2266 of the Civil Code. See Note, 8 TUL. L. REV.
280, 282 (1933). In France, in contests between vendors claiming a lien and a
mortgagee, the latter prevails. It is argued that recognition of a vendor's lien in
these circumstances would be contrary to the Code and the mortgage system. See
12 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TRAIT1 PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANCAIS 220 (2d ed.
1953).
171. See supra notes 158, 159. As to contests between ordinary and mortgage
creditors of the owner of the immovable, see New Orleans Canal and Banking Co.
v. Leeds & Co., 49 La. Ann. 123, 21 So. 168 (1897) (ordinary creditors prevailed;
things not immobilized) ; Breaux v. Ganucheau, 3 La. App. 481 (1st Cir. 1925)
(mortgage creditor prevailed; things immobilized). As to contests between vendors
and vendees of an immovable, see supra note 163.
172. See supra text at note 26.
173. See supra text at note 44.
174. See supra text at notes 26, 46.
175. See supra text at notes 29, 50.
176. See Gauche Realty v. Jansen, 158 La. 379, 104 So. 122 (1925) (marble
wainscoting, plumbing, and electric light fixtures, became property of the lessor
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tract, the owner of the improvements should always be permit-
ted to remove them1 77 and the issue of immobilization should be
immaterial. And in case the landowner transfers title to these
things - which he does not own - to innocent third parties, the
issue of immobilization should be equally immaterial.
Incorporeal Immovables
Article 470 of the Civil Code states that "incorporeal things,
consisting only in a right, are not of themselves strictly sus-
ceptible of the quality of movables or immovables; nevertheless
they are placed in one or the other of these classes, according to
the object to which they apply.' 178  The following Article 471
declares that the usufruct and the use of immovable things, a
servitude established on an immovable estate, and an action for
the recovery of an immovable estate or an entire succession "are
considered as immovable from the object to which they apply.' ' 1 79
From the viewpoint of strict logic, the distinction between
movables and immovables should be applied, in principle, to cor-
poreal things only. 80 In the French Civil Code,' 8 ' however, and in
the Louisiana Civil Code, incorporeal things (namely rights)
are classified for a number of purposes as either movable or im-
movable. The distinction of rights into movables and immovables
is ordinarily based on the nature of the thing which is the object
of the right, and, at times, is an arbitrary choice. Adoption of
this distinction by the French Civil Code and the Louisiana Civil
Code was the result of departure from Roman law standards in
upon termination of the lease as "permanent improvements" according to con-
tract) ; Morris v. Pratt, 114 La. 98, 38 So. 70 (1905) ("embellishments and
decorations" became property of the lessor upon the termination of the lease ac-
cording to contract) ; Boykin v. Boykin, 4 La. App. 210 (2d Cir. 1926) ("Delco
lighting plant" was "an improvement" included in succession settlement). See
also Lighting Fixture Supply Co. v. Pacific Fire Ins. Co., 176 La. 449, 146 So.
35 (1933).
177. See Louisiana Ry. & Nay. Co. v. Cash Grocery & Sales Co., 150 So. 57
(La. App. 1st Cir. 1933). Cf. Stanfa v. Bynum, 37 F. Supp. 962 (W.D. La.
1941).
178. Cf. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 462 (1825) ; LA. CIVIL CODE 1808 (no corre-
sponding article). See also Comment, Incorporeal Immovables, 19 Tnt. L. REV.
610 (1945).
179. Cf. LA. CIVL CODE art. 463 (1825) ; LA. CIVIL CODE p. 98, art. 22 (1808).
180. See SOHM-MITTEIS-WENGER, INSTITUTIONEN DES R6MISCHEN RECHTS 256
(1923); WEiss, INSTITUTIONEN DES R6MISCHEN PRIVATRECHTS 128 (1949);
MONIER, MANUEL ELAMENTAIRE DE DROIT ROMAIN 341, 353 (1947).
181. See FRENCH CIVIL CODE art. 516. Cf. GREEK CIVIL CODE art. 949: "When-
ever distinction is made in the law or in a juridical act between the immovable
property of a person, as a whole, and his movable property, in the immovables are
included the usufruct and predial servitudes on immovables, and in the movablea
all obligations." (Transl. by writer.)
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the fields of successions and community property.182 It was
thought necessary that, in connection with transfer of property
rights in these two broad fields, certain rights should be included
in the category of immovables. Naturally, the distinction could
have been avoided by an enumeration of these rights in the part
of the Code dealing with these institutions.
Be that as it may, the interpretation and application of Ar-
ticle 471 involves a number of difficult questions. It is not clear,
for example, whether the list of incorporeal immovables is ex-
clusive or merely indicative. The view that any incorporeal not
listed in Article 471 is movable may be supported by reference
to Article 475, which indicates that the category of things "mov-
able" is a residual one consisting of all things, whether corporeal
or incorporeal, not classified as immovable by nature or by dis-
position of law.'" On the other hand, the view that the list in
Article 471 is merely indicative may be supported by reference
to other considerations. The first two groups of incorporeal im-
movables listed in Article 471 include all fragments of the right
of ownership over immovables which can form the object of in-
dependent real rights in Louisiana. l s 4 The right of ownership
itself is conspicuously missing from the enumeration of incor-
poreal immovables. The omission can be explained as the result
of a tendency to overlook the obvious fact that the owner of a
corporeal thing has not only control over its body but also a
right of ownership over it.185 But if fragments of the right of
ownership over immovables, such as use, usufruct, and servi-
tudes, are regarded as incorporeal immovables in Louisiana, it
would be hardly tenable to regard the sum total of these frag-
ments as something different in nature. Characterization of the
right of ownership over immovables as an incorporeal immovable
is, indeed, important. It is in this way that full proprietary pro-
tection may be accorded to the owner of an immovable, in con-
nection with the use and enjoyment of his property. 8
182. See 3 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TRAITt PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FBANgAIB 70
(2d ed. 1952).
183. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 475 (1870) ; infra text at note 245.
184. C . LA. CIVIL CODE art. 646 (1870) ; Comment, Incorporeal Immovables,
19 TuL. L. REV. 610, 613 (1945). See Wemple v. Nabors Oil and Gas Co., 154
La. 483, 97 So. 666 (1923) ; Iberville Land Co. v. Texas Co., 128 So. 304 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1930).
185. See 3 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TRAITt PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANQAIS 96
(2d ed. 1952) ; 9 DEMOLOMBE, TRAITt DE LA DISTINCTION DES BIENS 19 (1874-82).
186. Cf. Arcadia Bonded Warehouse Co. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 206
La. 681, 19 So.2d 514 (1944).
1962]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
French commentators elaborating on corresponding provi-
sions in the French Civil Code have not hesitated to extend the
list so as to include all real rights on immovables. Thus, the
rights of usufruct, use, habitation, predial servitudes, emphy-
teusis, and ownership are regarded in France as incorporeal im-
movables. I5 7  Assuming that the list in Article 471 may be ex-
panded in Louisiana, it is still a difficult question to determine
which other rights could be regarded as incorporeal immovables.
All recognized real rights in Louisiana have been included in
Article 471, with the exception of the right of ownership (dis-
cussed hereinabove) and the right of habitation. Habitation has
no practical significance in Louisiana today, and, in any case,
it may be regarded as included in the enumeration: habitation
is the use of a dwelling house.'" From the viewpoint of economic
considerations and actual importance, the most interesting ques-
tion is whether mineral rights are incorporeal immovables with-
in the meaning of Article 471.189
Mineral rights in Louisiana are founded upon a non-owner-
ship theory.I9° Contracts granting mineral rights give merely
the right to search for and reduce to possession all minerals
found.19 ' Mineral rights may derive from contracts of sale, res-
ervation, or lease. 9 2 Sale and reservation of mineral rights have
been almost consistently classified as servitudes, 9 8 while mineral
leases were treated for many years under various classifications.
The Louisiana Supreme Court declared in 1922 that a mineral
lease was a "personal servitude in the nature of a limited usu-
187. See 3 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TRAITt PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANCAIS 95
(2d ed. 1952) ; 1 COLIN, CAPITANT, ET JULLIOT DE LA MORANDIkRE, TRAITt DE
DROIT CIVIL 835 (11th ed. 1953).
188. See LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 626-628 (1870).
189. See DAGGETT, MINERAL RIGHTS IN LOUISIANA 27 (1939).
190. See Frost-Johnson Lumber Co. v. Salling's Heirs, 150 La. 756, 91 So.
207 (1922) ; Harwood Oil & Mining Co. v. Black, 240 La. 641, 651, 124 So.2d
764, 767 (1960) : "The usual oil and gas lease 'is a contract of letting and hiring
within the meaning of the codal articles, and ... the lessee in such a mineral lease
obtains an obligatory or personal right only, and not a servitude or a real right
in the land': Arnold v. Sun Oil Co., 218 La. 50, 48 So.2d 401."
* 191. See Perkins v. Long-Bell Petroleum Co., 227 La. 1044, 81 So.2d 389
(1955); Frost-Johnson Lumber Co. v. Salling's Heirs, 150 La. 756, 91 So. 207
(1922).
192. See Wemple v. Nabors Oil & Gas Co., 154 La. 483, 97 So. 666 (1923)
(sale) ; Frost-Johnson Lumber Co. v. Salling's Heirs, 150 La. 756, 91 So. 207
.(1922) (reservation) ; Logan v. State Gravel Co., 158 La. 105, 103 So. 526
(1925) (lease).
193. See Starr Davis Oil Co. v. Webber, 218 La. 231, 48 So.2d 906 (1950);
Holcombe v. Superior Oil Co., 213 La. 684, 35 So.2d 457 (1948). Subsequent
,sale of reserved minerals, however, is the sale of an "incorporeal right" and not
the sale of a servitude. See Deas v. Lane, 202 La. 933, 13 So.2d 270 (1943).
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fruct.' 1 94 Thus, mineral leases could, perhaps, qualify as incor-
poreal immovables either "as usufruct" or "as servitudes." In
subsequent cases, however, the Supreme Court announced that
mineral leases had never been defined to be a true usufruct 95 so
as to fall within the first group of incorporeal immovables under
Article 471, and that this type of servitude could not be included
within the second group of incorporeal immovables under Article
471 because it did not attach to the immovable so as to pass with
it.1 96 It seems, however, that in a number of cases, and for sev-
eral purposes, mineral leases were treated in Louisiana as servi-
tudes and as immovable rights.1 97
But in Gulf Refining Co. v. Glassell,19 decided in 1936, the
Supreme Court repudiated all prior inconsistent cases and de-
clared that mineral leases were personal rights rather than servi-
tudes, subject to the code provisions governing ordinary leases.
In response to this decision, the Louisiana legislature passed Act
205 of 1938 defining and classifying mineral leases as real rights
and as incorporeal immovable property.199 When the act was at-
tacked as involving a retroactive change in substantive property
law, the Louisiana Supreme Court upheld its constitutionality
on the ground that the purpose of the act was merely to give a
procedural remedy.2 " The act was amended in 1950 to include
194. See Palmer Corp. of Louisiana v. Moore, 171 La. 774, 782, 132 So. 229,
231 (1931) ; Frost-Johnson Lumber Co. v. Salling's Heirs, 150 La. 756, 780, 91
So. 207, 216 (1922). See also State ex rel. Bush v. United Gas Pub. Serv. Co.,
185 La. 496, 169 So. 523 (1936) ; Federal Land Bank v. Mulhern, 180 La. 627,
157 So. 370 (1934) ; Wiley v. Davis, 164 La. 1090, 115 So. 280 (1928).
195. See Sample v. Whitaker, 172 La. 722, 135 So. 38 (1931). In this case,
however, the question of the nature of a mineral lease as movable or immovable
was not before the court.
196. See Wilkins v. Nelson, 155 La. 807, 99 So. 607 (1924). Cf. Wilkins v.
Nelson, 161 La. 437, 108 So. 875 (1926).
197. See Hamilton v. Glassel, 57 F.2d 1032 (5th Cir. 1932) ; Noble v. Plouf,
154 La. 429, 97 So. 599 (1923) (sale of lease subject to the rules governing sale
of immovable property). See also Arent v. Hunter, 171 La. 1059, 133 So. 157
(1931) ; Wiley v. Davis, 164 La. 1090, 115 So. 280 (1928). Cf. State ex rel. Bush
v. United Gas Pub. Serv. Co., 185 La. 496, 498, 169 So. 523, 524 (1936) : "The
fact that an oil and gas lease is one of servitude is no longer a debatable question
in this state."
198. 186 La. 190, 171 So. 846 (1936). See also Ferguson v. Britt, 191 La. 371,
185 So. 287 (1938) ; Tomlinson v. Thurmon, 189 La. 959, 181 So. 458 (1938) ;
Tyson v. Spearman, 190 La. 871, 183 So. 201 (1938); Posey v. Fargo, 187 La.
122, 174 So. 175 (1937).
199. La. Acts 1938, No. 205, LA. R.S. 9:1105 (1950) ; Hebert & Lazarus, The
Louisiana Legislation of 1938, 1 I.OUISIANA LAW REVIEW 80, 100 (1938) ; Moses,
A Short History of the Derelopment of the Statutory Definition and Classification
of an Oil, Gas and Mineral Lease as a Real Right, 13 TUL. L. REV. 416 (1939).
. 200. Tyson v. Surf Oil Co., 195 La. 248, 196 So. 336 (1940). In most sub-
sequent cases, the courts, though recognizing the lessee's rights as being "real,"
consistently held that Act 205 did not confer new substantive rights but was mere-
ly "remedial and procedural" in character. See Wier v. Grubb, 215 La. 967, 41
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a declaration that it "shall be considered as substantive as well
as procedural. ' 20 1 It would seem that the purpose of the amend-
ment was to classify mineral leases as real rights and incor-
poreal immovables for all purposes. The Supreme Court, how-
ever, has indicated that this amendment did not convert mineral
leases from personal contracts into immovable rights °. 20  The
nature of mineral leases as personal contracts remained unaf-
fected, but these leases are considered as real rights so that
lessees may benefit from the application of real property laws. 20
This approach may be criticized as contra legem interpretation
and as conducive to confusion. In any case, the question of the
nature of mineral leases may be regarded as settled. Though
personal contracts in nature, mineral leases are treated as im-
movable property in connection with issues of procedure al-
ways,20 4 and in connection with issues of substantive law in a
number of situations specified by jurisprudence and legisla-
tion.20 5 Expansion of Article 471 to include rights other than
So.2d 846 (1949) ; Allison v. Maroun, 193 La. 286, 190 So. 408 (1939) ; Payne
v. Walmsley, 185 So. 88 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1938). Thus, despite the 1938 enact-
ment, mineral leases continued to be treated as contracts creating only personal
obligations governed by the code articles on lease. See Arnold v. Sun Oil Co., 218
La. 50, 48 So.2d 369 (1950) (mineral lessee not protected by the recordation
statutes). The case was overruled by legislative action. See La. Acts 1950, No.
7, LA. R.S. 9:2721-24 (1950). See also Coyle v. North Am. Oil Consol., 201 La.
99, 9 So.2d 473 (1.942) (cancellation of lease) ; Amerada Petroleum Corp. v.
Reese, 195 La. 359, 196 So. 558 (1940) (partition). The last case was overruled
by the amendment of Article 741 of the Civil Code. See infra note 205. But cf.
Davidson v. Midstates Oil Corp., 211 La. 882, 31 So.2d 7 (1947) ; Arkansas Lou-
isiana Gas Co. v. R. 0. Roy & Co., 196 La. 121, 198 So. 768 (1940) (leases
incorporeal immovable property within the meaning of Article 471 of the Civil
Code for purposes of formalities of transfer) ; Alison v. Wideman, 210 La. 314,
26 So.2d 826 (1946) (mineral lease an incorporeal immovable for purposes of
petitory action); Payne v. Walmsley, supra (mineral lease an incorporeal im-
movable for purposes of venue).
201. La. Acts 1950, No. 6, LA. R.S. 9:1105 (1950). See also LA. CODE OF
CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 3664 (1960).
202. See Harwood Oil & Mining Co. v. Black, 240 La. 641, 124 So.2d 764
(1960) ; Tinsley v. Seismic Explorations, Inc., 239 La. 23, 117 So.2d 897 (1960)
Reagan v. Murphy, 235 La. 529, 105 So.2d 210 (1958).
203. See Reagan v. Murphy, 235 La. 529, 105 So.2d 210 (1958).
.204. See supra notes 200, 201. See also LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art.
3664 (1960). However, in spite of the declaration of this article that the mineral
lessee "owns a real right," there is still room for doubt that the mineral lessee
will enjoy in Louisiana the full protection accorded by the real actions. See
Comment, The Louisiana Mineral Lease as a Contract Creating Real Rights, 35
TUL. L. REV. 218, 229 (1960).
205. Mineral leases are subject to mortgage as immovable property. See infra
note 215. Transfer of leases and of mineral interests must be made by written
contract. See supra note 200. The rights of the mineral lessee in a judicial parti-
tion by licitation are, in effect, equivalent to real rights. See LA. CIvIL CODE art.
741 (1870), as amended by La. Acts 1940, No. 336, and La. Acts 1950, No.
521; Nabors, Report to the Mineral Law Committee of the Louisiana State Law
-Institute, 26 TUL. L. REV. 172, 180 (1952). The mineral lease operates as a
"real" right in connection with the problem of reliance on public records. See
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mineral leases does not seem to be desirable. In one case the
Louisiana Supreme Court suggested that the lessee's right to the
use and enjoyment of improvements placed by him on leased
premises was an immovable right.20 6  This declaration, made
without reference to Article 471, does not seem to be compatible
with the structure of the Louisiana Civil Code and an unbroken
line of jurisprudence interpreting Article 471.
The third group of incorporeal immovables listed in Article
471 includes actions "for the recovery of an immovable or an
entire succession." All actions directed to the recovery of an im-
movable and not only the petitory action should be regarded as
incorporeal immovables.2 7 This conclusion was reached in
France by courts and commentators elaborating on the corre-
sponding provision of the French Civil Code. 5  The Louisiana
Supreme Court seems inclined to apply a rather narrow construc-
tion. The right of a universal legatee claiming the movable part
LA. R.S. 9:2721-24 (1950); Serio v. Chadwick, 66 So.2d 9 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1953). With regard to geophysical trespass, the owner of a mineral servitude
(deriving his rights from a sale) enjoys full proprietary protection. See Holcombe
v. Superior Oil Co., 213 La. 684, 35 So.2d 457 (1948). But a mineral lessee
apparently enjoys less than full proprietary protection. See Tinsley v. Seismic
Explorations, Inc., 239 La. 23, 117 So.2d 897 (1960). It would seem that the
Tinsley case is overruled by Article 3664 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Finally,
the mineral lease does not create a real right with regard to the rules governing
liberative prescription. See Reagan v. Murphy, 235 La. 529, 105 So.2d 210 (1958).
The reasoning of the Reagan case has been disapproved by the legislature, at least
insofar as it may bear on real actions. See LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 3664
(1960), Comment (a). The mineral lease in Louisiana may thus be regarded as
a hybrid contract at times "governed by the codal provisions on lease, sale, or
servitude, separately or in combination, and at other times by specific statutes
enacted by the Legislature." Comment, The Louisiana Mineral Lease as a Con-
tract Creating Mineral Rights, 35 TUL. L. REv. 218 (1960).
206. Lighting Fixture Supply Co. v. Pacific Fire Ins. Co., 176 La. 499, 146
So. 35, 39 (1933) ("the only thing owned by the lessee . . . was his immovable
right of use and enjoyment in the improvements"). The right to use pews in a
church has been also classified as an incorporeal immovable. See Succession of
Gamble, 23 La. Ann. 9 (1871). See also Penny v. Christmas, 7 Rob. 481 (La.
1844) (money to be invested in lands treated as land for purposes of succession).
207. See LA. CODE OF PRACTICE art. 12 (1870) ("Although incorporeal rights
be not in reality movables nor immovables, they are nevertheless placed by law in
one of these two classes. Actions tending to recover an immovable or a real right,
or an universality of things, such as an inheritance, are considered as real; while
actions for the recovery of a movable or of a sum of money, though accompanied
with a mortgage, are not real actions.") ; Alison v. Wideman, 210 La. 314, 26
So.2d 826 (1946) (the owner of a real right or incorporeal immovable property
could resort to the petitory action against party in possession of immovable prop-
erty) ; Stephens v. Jones, 14 La. App. 113, 129 So. 555 (2d Cir. 1930) (fixing
boundary is a real right) ; Weber v. Ory, 14 La. Ann. 537 (1859) (the right of
action to compel partition of immovable is an immovable right). Cf. LA. CODE
OF CIVIL PRocEDuRE art. 422 (2) (1960) : "A real action is one brought to enforce
rights in, to, or upon immovable property." See also LA. CODE OF CIVIL PRO-
CEDURE arts. 3651, 3655 (1960).
208. See 3 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TRAITt PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANCAIS
97-98 (2d ed. 1952).
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of an entire succession 20 9 and the right of presumptive heirs to
enter into possession of revenues of an absentee's estate210 have
been characterized as movable. But the right of an heir entitled
to claim an entire succession composed only of movables should
be classified as an incorporeal immovable. 211
Article 471 does not define the practical consequences of the
classification of a thing as an incorporeal immovable. It would
seem that, as to things so classified, most provisions governing
immovable property should apply by analogy.212 Incorporeal im-
movables, however, listed in Article 471 or established by other
legislative texts and by jurisprudence, are not treated in all re-
spects as immovable property. Several provisions governing
"immovables" or "immovable property" seem to apply only to
corporeal objects. Thus, the rules of the Civil Code defining im-
movables susceptible of a real mortgage are said to apply only to
corporeal immovables, notwithstanding the language of Article
3289 (1), which refers without qualification to "immovables sub-
ject to alienation.1218 According to Article 3289 (2), the only in-
corporeal immovable which can be mortgaged under the Code is
the usufruct of an immovable. 214 Legislative action, however,
has conferred the right to mortgage mineral rights215 and lessees'
interests in any immovable property. 2 6 The procedural rule that
the location of an immovable determines the place of litigation 21 7
has been held to apply to both corporeal and incorporeal immov-
ables. 218 It is questionable whether the provisions of the Civil
Code governing lesion apply to incorporeal immovables, notwith-
209. See Bonneau v. Poydras, 2 Rob. 1 (La. 1842).
210. See Westover v. Aime, 11 Mart.(O.S.) 443 (La. 1822).
211. Cf. Succession of Harris, 179 La. 954, 155 So. 446 (1934).
212. Analogy would fail only in connection with provisions which cannot apply
to incorporeal immovables. See, e.g., LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1436 (1870), providing
that all incorporeal things, whether movable or immovable, may become the sub-
ject of an inter vivos donation only in accordance with an authentic act. The
reason for this requirement is the impossibility of manual delivery of incorporeal
things. Cf. LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 1538-39 (1870).
213. See LA. CIVIL CODE art. 3289(1) (1870). Voorhis v. DeBlane, 12 La.
Ann. 864 (1857) (an entire succession or an action for the recovery of an entire
succession though "incorporeal immovable" may not be subject to mortgage).
214. See LA. CIVIL CoDn art. 3289(2) (1870).
215. See La. Acts 1910, No. 232, LA. R.S. 30:109 (1950) ; La. Acts 1938, No.
96, LA. R.S. 9:5101 (1950); Hebert & Lazarus, The Louisiana Legislation of
1938; Mortgage of Mineral Rights. 1 LOurSIANA LAw REVIEW 80 (1938).
216. See La. Acts 1926, No. 186, LA. R.S. 9:5102 (1950).
217. See LA. CODE OF PRACTICE arts. 163, 164 (1870). Cf. LA. CODE OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE arts. 80, 81 (1960).
218. Payne v. Walmsley, 185 So. 88 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1938) (mineral lease).
But cf. Scott v. Howells, 177 La. 137, 148 So. 6 (1933) (venue not where the
succession is opened but where corporeal immovable is located).
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standing the broad language of Article 1862 which refers to "im-
movables. ' ' 219 Louisiana courts have allowed the action for lesion
beyond moiety in connection with sales of immovables by nature
or destination, 220 but have refused to allow it in cases involving
sale of mineral interests.221 In the light of Act 205 of 1938, as
amended, expansion in this direction, with regard to sale of de-
veloped leases, may be expected. Rules restricting transfer of an
immovable by oral agreement, and those requiring recordation
of transfer to become effective against third persons, apply in
principle to both incorporeal and corporeal immovables.222 Con-
flicting determinations have been made in connection with the
interpretation of the word "immovable" in statutory legislation.
Thus, Act 236 of 1920,223 governing real estate sales by real
estate brokers, has been held inapplicable to sales of mineral
rights.2 24 Act 136 of 1922,225 however, placing a limitation on
the use of co-insurance clauses in policies covering property of
a certain value other than movable property, has been held ap-
plicable to insurance of the owner's right of use and occu-
pancy.22
6
Articles 470 and 471 fail to furnish workable tests for a clear
line of demarcation between incorporeal movables and immov-
ables. Conflicting judicial determinations, on the other hand,
fail to furnish a reliable guide as to the consequences of classifi-
cation. Perhaps abandonment of the distinction would be the
219. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1862 (1870).
220. Simmons v. Tremont Lumber Co., 144 La. 719, 81 So. 263 (1919) ; Smith
v. Huie-Hodge Lumber Co., 129 La. 28, 55 So. 698 (1911) ; Smith v. Huie-Hodge
Lumber Co., 123 La. 959, 49 So. 655 (1909) ; Hyde v. Barron, 125 La. 227, 51
So. 126 (1909).
221. Wilkins v. Nelson, 155 La. 807, 812, 99 So. 607, 608 (1924) : "When
article 1862 of the Code restricted the action of lesion to immovables, it meant
immovables which are such by their nature and not such as are made immovable
by the disposition of the law." See also Haas v. Cerami, 201 La. 612, 10 So.2d
61 (1942) ; Vander Sluys v. Finfrock, 158 La. 175, 103 So. 730 (1925) ; Silber-
nagel v. Harrell, 18 La. App. 536, 138 So. 713 (2d Cir. 1932). Cf. Stanfa v.
Bynum, 37 F. Supp. 962 (W.D. La. 1941) (lease not an incorporeal immovable
subject to law governing lesion).
222. LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 2246, 2264, 2275, 2440-42, 2449 (1870) ; Deas v.
Lane, 202 La. 933, 13 So. 2d 270 (1943) ; Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co. v. R. 0.
Roy & Co., 196 La. 121, 198 So. 768 (1940) ; Hamilton v. Glassel, 57 F.2d 1032
(5th Cir. 1932) ; Noble v. Plouf, 154 La. 430, 97 So. 599 (1923) ; Bailey v. Ward,
32 La. Ann. 839 (1880) ; Guier v. Guier, 7 La. Ann. 103 (1852).
223. See La. Acts 1920, No. 236, LA. R.S. 37:1431 (1950).
224. See Vander Sluys v. Finfrock, 158 La. 175, 103 So. 730 (1925). See also
Stanford v. Bischoff, 159 La. 892, 106 So. 371 (1925).
225. See La. Acts 1922, No. 136, amended by La. Acts 1948, No. 195 and No.
330, LA. R.S. 22:694 (Supp. 1960).
226. Arcadia Bonded Warehouse Co. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 206 La.
681, 19 So.2d 514 (1944).
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most preferable solution in case of a future revision of the Lou-
isiana Civil Code. In the absence of a general revision of the
Code, amendment of Article 471 for the purpose of precise enu-
meration of incorporeal immovables and definition of the effects
of classification may be the right solution. 27
De-immobilization
It has been observed that the Louisiana Civil Code does not
provide for de-immobilization of things which become immovable
by nature or by destination.22 According to physical notions,
component parts of the ground or buildings, and all things per-
manently attached thereto, can be detached and removed. The
legal question is under which circumstances these things can be
regarded as de-immobilized, namely, as having reassumed the
status of movable things.
De-immobilization may occur either as a result of a juridical
act of the owner or as a consequence of other circumstances in-
dicating that the close association of the movables with the im-
movable has come to an end. In general, the owner enjoys the
right to dispose of his property as he pleases. Accordingly, if his
ownership is not encumbered by rights of other persons, the
owner may tear down buildings and other improvements and
de-immobilize them at will.229 If the immovable is encumbered
by a real mortgage, however, the owner's freedom to de-immobil-
ize things at will may run counter to the interests of the mort-
gagee. The law, therefore, has developed toward solutions which,
on the one hand, enable the owner to obtain additional funds by
offering as security or selling things which were movables but
had become immobilized, and on the other hand, tend to safe-
guard the interests of innocent third parties and those of the
mortgagee.
It is clear that, as a general rule, a real mortgage extends
over all things which are immovable by nature or by destination,
whether existing on the premises at the time of recordation of
the real mortgage, or placed thereon subsequently. 280 Exception
is made by Act 199 of 1934 for "livestock and implements of hus-
bandry used in farming": whether permanently attached to the
227. See Comment, Incorporeal Immovables, 19 TuiL. L. REV. 610, 620 (1945).
228. See Bon Air Planting Co. v. Barringer, 142 La. 60, 76 So. 234 (1917).
But cf. LA. CrviL CODE art. 476 (1870).
229. See Bank of White Castle v. Clark, 181 La. 303, 159 So. 409 (1935).
230. See supra note 162.
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land or not, these things are not affected by a mortgage on a
rural estate. 28 ' Further, exception is made by Act 172 of 1944
for all movable property subject to a chattel mortgage.0 2 Ac-
cording to the legislative declaration this property "shall and
will remain movable, in so far as the mortgage upon it is con-
cerned, and shall not pass by the sale of the immovable property
to which it has actually or fictitiously attached, whether such
sale be conventional or judicial." 8  Accordingly, for purposes
of mortgage, the issue of immobilization or de-immobilization of
these exempt things becomes immaterial.
With regard to things affected by a real mortgage according
to the general rule, distinction, perhaps, should be made between
those brought in after the recordation of the mortgage and those
already existing on the premises at the time of recordation. As
to the former, the owner should, and does, enjoy freedom to de-
immobilize. As to the latter, de-immobilization by the act of the
owner should, perhaps, be excluded. This solution could be ob-
tained by reference to Articles 3289 (1) and 3397 (1) of the Civil
Code, in combination with Article 3310.24 This, however, does
not seem to be the law. Apparently due to the difficulties in-
volved in the judicial administration of such a prohibition, and
also due to the desire of the courts to protect innocent third
parties acquiring rights on movable things in good faith, the
owner may de-immobilize things originally covered by the mort-
gage.285 De-immobilization, however, of certain home appliances
231. LA. R.S. 9:5104 (1950). These things may become subject to a chattel
mortgage. LA. R.S. 9:5351 (1950).
232. LA. R.S. 9:5357 (1950).
233. Ibid. According to the same statute, its violation entails criminal re-
sponsibility. Id. 9:5358.
234. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 3289 (1870): "The following objects alone are sus-
ceptible of mortgage: 1. Immovables subject to alienation, and their accessories
considered likewise as immovables"; LA. CIVIL CODE art. 3397 (1870): "The
mortgage has the following effects: 1. That the debtor can not sell, engage or
mortgage the same property to other person, to the prejudice of the mortgage
which is already made to another creditor"; LA. CrvIL ConE art. 3310 (1870) :
"The conventional mortgage, when once established on an immovable, includes all
the improvements which it may afterwards receive."
235. See Weil v. Lapeyre, 38 La. Ann. 303 (1886) ; Meyer v. Frederick, 26
La. Ann. 537 (1874) ; Citizens Bank v. Knapp, 22 La. Ann. 117 (1870) ; Weill
v. Thompson, 24 Fed. 14 (E.D. La. 1885) (machinery subject to a real mortgage
may be de-immobilized even after institution of foreclosure proceedings). See also
Wakefield State Bank v. T. FitzWilliams & Co., 158 La. 838, 104 So. 734 (1925) ;
Folse v. Triche, 113 La. 915, 37 So. 875 (1904). Thus, the mortgagee enjoys his
additional security on things immobilized by nature or destination only while these
things are in the hands of the mortgagor. See Sacco v. Centerville Co., 155 La.
569, 99 So. 452 (1924). There are, however, cases indicating that the mortgage
creditor cannot remove fixtures from the mortgaged premises since the fixtures
are a part of the creditor's security. See New Orleans Nat'l Bank v. Raymond,
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and equipment is excluded by Act 361 of 1946, which provides
that these appliances, subject to a real mortgage, shall remain
immovable by destination until the indebtedness is paid.
238
De-immobilization by the act of the owner of things subject
to a real mortgage may be effected by sale23 7 of the movable
things concerned or by the execution of a chattel mortgage.23 8
De-immobilization serves not only the interests of the owner but
primarily the interests of innocent third parties; therefore, in
case of fraud or collusion, de-immobilization does not take
place.23 9 For effective de-immobilization by sale, removal of the
things from the premises and delivery to the purchaser is neces-
sary.2 40 In case the things are delivered to the purchaser but not
removed, the purchaser must prove his good faith.2 41 These
rules, obviously, tend to safeguard the interests of mortgage
creditors looking for their security to the immovable with all its
accessories. For de-immobilization by chattel mortgage all requi-
site formalities must be fulfilled.
Even without sale and execution of a chattel mortgage, actual
detachment by overt act of the owner has been said to be suffi-
29 La. Ann. 355 (1877) (a building). See also Theurer v. Nautre, 23 La. Ann.
749 (1871) (machinery set in bricks cannot be removed from mortgaged land after
seizure); Mechanics and Traders Ins. Co. v. Gerson, 38 La. Ann. 310 (1886)
(fraudulent removal of things).
236. LA. R.S. 9:5357 (1950). The violation of this provision entails criminal
responsibility. See LA. R.S. 9:5359 (1950), as amended by La. Acts 1954, No.
391. See also LA. R.S. 6:769 (1950) (indebtedness to a building and loan asso-
ciation). Cf. LA. R.S. 9:1104 (1950) (machinery).
237. See Sacco v. Centerville Co., 155 La. 569, 99 So. 452 (1924) ; see Weil
v. Lapeyre, 38 La. Ann. 303 (1886) ; Citizens' Bank v. Knapp, 22 La. Ann. 117
(1870).
238. See Buchler v. Fourroux, 193 La. 445, 476, 190 So. 640, 650 (1939)
(dicta) : ("If the movables had been immobilized by the owner of the land . . .
he might subsequently de-immobilize them by granting a mortgage on them"). See
also Bank of White Castle v. Clark, 181 La. 303, 159 So. 409 (1935). The narrow
holding of this case was that mules and agricultural implements subject to a chat-
tel mortgage in accordance with Act 198 of 1918 were not covered by a subsequent
real mortgage. Language in the case might be taken to indicate that things im-
mobilized by destination and subject to a real mortgage could be de-immobilized
by executing a subsequent chattel mortgage. Cf. Alliance Trust Co. v. Gueydan
Bank, 162 La. 1062, 111 So. 421 (1927) (mortgage on land, in order to include
livestock should contain a description in accordance with Act 169 of 1914; no
such description was necessary for other implements).
239. See Mechanics' & Traders' Ins. Co. v. Gerson, 38 La. Ann. 310 (1886)
Weil v. Lapeyre, 38 La. Ann. 303 (1886). In any case, the mortgage creditor has
the right to enjoin the sale. Ibid. But cf. Weill v. Thompson, 24 Fed. 14 (E.D.
La. 1885) ; Citizens' Bank v. Knapp, 22 La. Ann. 117 (1870) (good faith im-
material).
240. See Bon Air Planting Co. v. Barringer, 142 La. 60, 76 So. 234 (1917).
241. See Von Puhl v. Caire & Graugnard, 12 Orl. App. 93 (La. App. Orl. Cir.
1915).
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cient for de-immobilization. 242 This is doubtful. The only case
in point merely held that detached materials, such as dismantled
machinery, junk, and certain implements no longer in use could
be seized by ordinary creditors separately from the land.248 De-
immobilization may also occur without regard to act or intention
of the owner. Things damaged so that they cannot function with
respect to the land or buildings to which they are attached are
regarded as de-immobilized whether covered by a mortgage or
not.244 But where the thing can be repaired, de-immobilization
does not occur. This rule is apparently based on Article 476 of
the Civil Code, which declares that materials "arising" from
demolitions of buildings are movable. Obviously this rule can-
not apply to things which in spite of attachment remain movable
or to things which cannot be de-immobilized until the indebted-
ness they secure is fully paid.
MOVABLES
In Louisiana, the category of movable things is a residual
one. According to Article 475 of the Civil Code, "all things cor-
poreal or incorporeal, which have not the character of immov-
ables by their nature or by the disposition of the law, according
to the rules laid down in this title, are considered as mov-
ables. ' '245 Movables are subdivided into "movables by their na-
ture" and "movables by the disposition of the law. '246 The two
groups will be dealt with separately. As the Louisiana Civil
Code follows the French Civil Code rather closely in this area,
reference to French jurisprudence and doctrine with regard to
particular issues will be both relevant and helpful.
242. See Buchler v. Fourroux, 193 La. 445, 476, 190 So. 640, 650 (1939).
Mere intention to detach is not sufficient. See Maginnis v. Union Oil Co., 47
La. Ann. 1489, 18 So. 459 (1895) ; Wel v. Lapeyre, 38 La. Ann. 303 (1886).
243. Wakefield State Bank v. T. FitzWilliams & Co., 158 La. 838, 104 So.
734 (1925). Dismantling of machinery following a sale made with the consent
of the mortgagee does not release the machinery from the mortgage. "The doctrine
which protects one who, in good faith, buys machinery from the mortgagor ...
has no application to a case like this." Straus v. New Orleans, 166 La. 1035,
1057, 118 So. 125, 133 (1928).
244. See Folse v. Triche, 113 La. 915, 917, 37 So. 875 (1904) : "When, from
any cause, a movable ceases to be of service to a tract of land, or is detached from
a building or tenement of which it formed a part as an accessory, there is no
longer ground for the claim that such movable appertains to the realty."
245. Of. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 467 (1825) ; LA. CIVIL CODE p. 100, art. 27
(1808).
246. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 472 (1870). Cf. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 464 (1825)
LA. CIVIL CODE p. 98, art. 23 (1808). The distinction between corporeal and
incorporeal movables is not merely academic. See, e.g., Succession of McGuire, 151
La. 514, 92 So. 40 (1922) (incorporeal movables insusceptible of inter vivos




This category includes all corporeal things which are not
classified as immovable by nature or destination. "Things mov-
able by their nature" are, according to the Code, "such as may be
carried from one place to another, whether they move by them-
selves, as cattle, or cannot be removed without an extraneous
power, as inanimate things" (Article 473) .247 For the character-
ization of a thing as movable by nature, controlling considera-
tions should be, apart from economic value, the possibility of re-
moval without application of extraordinary mechanical means or
damage to the substance of the thing.248 A thing may be movable
by nature although during its entire existence may have a fixed
place according to the wishes of its owner. In France, bath-
houses and several other structures on vessels permanently at-
tached to the banks of rivers by ropes are considered to be mov-
able, although similar structures on piles are regarded as immov-
able.249 Perhaps similar solutions could be given in Louisiana,
to the extent that such structures are regulated by state rather
than by federal law. 250 Mobile homes and trailers should also be
regarded as movables under the Louisiana Civil Code.251
The category of things movable by their nature does not in-
volve analytical difficulties, except in connection with the issue
of immobilization by nature or destination. In general, movables
do not lose their character when destined to become incorporated
in a building. The Code indicates that materials collected for the
purpose of erecting a building remain movables until actual in-.
corporation.252 Materials arising from the demolition of a build-
ing are also movables. 253 It is disputed in France whether ma-
247. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 473 (1870). See LA. CIVIL CODE art. 465 (1825);
LA. CIVIL CODE p. 98, art. 24 (1808).
248. Cf. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 469 (1870). A movable may be incorporated into
another movable and thus lose its individuality. See Roberts v. Williams, 99 So.2d
392 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1957) (new motor in automobile).
249. See 3 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TRAITt PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANQAIS
102 (2d ed. 1952).
250. The problem is whether these structures could qualify as "vessels" within
the admiralty jurisdiction of the United States. See Evansville & Bowling Green
Packet Co. v. Chero Cola Bottling Co., 271 U.S. 19 (1926) ; Charles Barnes Co.
v. One Dredge Boat, 169 Fed. 895 (E.D. Ky. 1909). See also Gn.orE & BLACK,
ADMIRALTY 28 (1957).
251. Perhaps, owing to considerations of relative value, the law should regard
mobile homes as immovable. In any case, in certain circumstances, mobile homes
could be regarded under the Civil Code as things immovable by destination.
252. LA. CVIL CODE art. 476 (1870). Of. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 468 (1825);
LA. CIVIL CODE p. 100, art. 28 (1808); Beard v. Duralde, 23 La. Ann. 284
(1871) ; supra notes 123-124.
253. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 476 (1870); Wakefield State Bank v. T. FitWl-
liams & Co., 158 La. 838, 104 So. 734 (1925).
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terials detached from an immovable for the purpose of repair
retain their status as immovables. The prevailing view is that
such materials do not change status. 25 4 In Louisiana, there is
no room for uncertainty, for the Code provides that materials
detached from an immovable for repairs or additions "and with
the intention of replacing them, . . . preserve the nature of im-
movables. ' 255
French jurisprudence is settled that energies, like electricity
and gas, when captured or fabricated so as to become objects of
ownership, are things movable by nature.256 As a result, the pro-
ducer of energies in France enjoys full proprietary protection.
Similar solutions should be reached in Louisiana. Energies, even
if not regarded as corporeal things movable by nature, are
"things" and may be quite valuable. 257 Electro-magnetic waves
produced in radio-telegraphy are not considered as susceptible
of private ownership in France. However, exclusion of propri-
etary protection in this case may be arbitrary.
Several things which could be regarded as movable by nature
may, nevertheless, be governed by rules of law applicable to im-
movables. In France, ships and airplanes are subject to rules
governing immovables with regard to transfer of ownership and
hypothecation. 25 8 In Louisiana, according to Article 3289(3) of
the Code "ships and other vessels" are designated as susceptible
of a real mortgage.2519 This provision is still in force insofar as
it is superseded by the federal Ship Mortgage Act of 1920.260 In
general, however, ships and airplanes in Louisiana should be re-
garded as things movable by nature. On the other hand, several
things which are immovable as part of the ground may be gov-
erned by rules applicable to movables. Such things are destined
254. See 3 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TRAITt PRATIQUE DR DROIT CIVIL FRANQAIS
103 (2d ed. 1952).
255. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 476 (2) (1870) ; Beard v. Duralde, 23 La. Ann. 284
(1871).
256. See 3 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TRAITt PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANQAIS
102 (2d ed. 1952) ; Cass. Civ. April 19, 1864, D. 1864.1.178.
257. See LA. CIVIL CODE art. 448 (1870). Of. LA. CRIMINAL CODE art. 2, 1 3
(1942) : " 'Anything of value' must be given the broadest possible construction,
including any conceivable thing of the slightest value, movable or immovable,
corporeal or incorporeal, public or private. It must be construed in the broad
popular sense of the phrase, and not necessarily as synonymous with the tradi-
tional legal term 'property.' "
258. See 3 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TRAITt PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANCA.IS
103 (2d ed. 1952).
259. See LA. R.S. 9:5381 (1950) (hypothecation and conveyances of vessels).
260. 41 STAT. 1005 (1920) ; 46 U.S.C. §1 951-975 (1959) ; LA. CIVIL CODE
art. 3305 (1870), as amended by La. Acts 1916, No. 105.
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to become movable, and, for certain purposes, the law looks into
future rather than present status.26' In France, standing crops
are governed by rules applicable to movables with regard to for-
malities of seizure and sale.2 2 The same is not generally true in
Louisiana.2 3 Standing timber, minerals to be extracted from the
soil, and materials to arise from demolition of buildings, are sub-
ject to the rules governing sale of movables in France. The
French Civil Code does not contain specific provisions in this re-
gard, but doctrine and jurisprudence are firmly settled.264 Dif-
ficulties have arisen with regard to interests of third parties ad-
versely affected by such sales. Courts in France, in order to pro-
tect innocent third parties, tend to characterize the sale of min-
eral interests (which include sale, reservation, or lease of min-
eral rights in Louisiana) as the sale of immovable property. Ac-
cordingly, recordation is necessary to be effective against third
persons. This jurisprudence has been criticized as internally
inconsistent and unrealistic. It is agreed that interests of third
parties could be protected adequately by the code requirement of
actual possession and exploitation: these would constitute suffi-
cient notice in absence of recordation. 265 In Louisiana, as a gen-
eral rule, lines of demarcation between movables and immovables
may be transcended in the private relations of contracting par-
ties; but with regard to interests of third parties, the lines of
demarcation established by law control. Consequently, sales of
standing crops by the landowner, and sales of timber and min-
eral interests, in order to be effective against third parties, must
be recorded.266
Movables by Disposition of Law
This group of movables consists of incorporeal things, name-
261. See supra note 29. Cf. Pickens v. Webster, 31 La. Ann. 870, 875 (1879).
(standing crop was "a movable, or . . . an apparent immovable mobilized by
anticipation").
262. See 3 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TRAIT]t PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANCAIS
105 (2d ed. 1952).
263. Crops belonging to a lessee are movable and, accordingly, any sale thereof
should be regarded as the sale of a movable. Crops belonging to the owner of
the ground, however, are immovable by nature and, presumably, a sale of the
land with standing crops by the landowner should be made in the form governing
sales of immovable property. Cf. supra notes 24, 26. Separate sale of standing
crops by the landowner should be regarded as sale of "future things." Cf. LA.
CIVIL CODE art. 2450 (1870). There is no distinction in Louisiana with regard
to forms of seizure applicable to movables and immovables.
264. See 3 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TRAIT]t PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANCAIS
106-107 (2d ed. 1952).
265. See 3 id. at 108.
266. See supra text at notes 22, 30, 200.
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ly, rights, obligations, and actions. The designation "movables
by the disposition of the law" is, therefore, less accurate than one
referring to "incorporeal movables," which would also corre-
spond with the analogous provision of Article 470.267
Article 474 of the Code contains a list 268 which, apparently,
is merely indicative. Rights are, in principle, movable and only
exceptionally are regarded as immovable in accordance with fic-
tions established by the law. The rights of ownership, servi-
tudes, usufruct, and use are movable when their object is a mov-
able thing. The Code does not say so expressly but the implica-
tion is clear. The right of ownership over movables is, ordi-
narily, confused with its object and may be regarded as included
in the group of movable things by necessary implication. The
nature of other rights as movable may be established by refer-
ence to Article 471, which indicates that rights are immovable
when their object is an immovable.2 69
Article 474 states that in this group are included "obligations
and actions, the object of which is to recover money due or mov-
ables," and "obligations which have for their object a specific
performance, and those which from their nature, resolve them-
selves into damages." The language used is broad enough to in-
clude all obligations to do or not to do because none of them has
an immovable character. 2 0 Article 474 also indicates that "per-
petual rents and annuities" are movables by the disposition of
the law. Rents and annuities are periodically recurring obliga-
tions to furnish a sum of money or other movables.271 Rent obli-
gations are distinguishable from those involving a performance
due only once. Rents include arrearages, namely, sums due but
not paid upon maturity. It is disputed whether in theory rents
are based on a principal right which generates the obligation to
render periodically accruing performances.2 12 For systematic
purposes, rents are distinguished by civilian writers into per-
petual rents and those established for life, depending on whether
267. The term "incorporeal movables" is employed in LA. R.S. 9:5365 (1950)
(incorporeal movables may not become subject to a chattel mortgage). Cf. LA.
R.S. 9:4321 (1950) (pledge of incorporeal rights).
268. Cf. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 466 (1825) ; LA. CIVIL CODE p. 98, art. 25 (1808).
269. See 3 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TRAITt PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANQAIS
110 (2d ed. 1952). Cf. supra text at note 179.
270. See 3 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TRAIT]t PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANQAIS
96-97, 113 (2d ed. 1952). Cf. Mille v. Dupuy, 21 La. Ann. 53 (1869).
271. See LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 2778, 2779, 2793 (1870).
272. See 3 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TRAITk PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANQAIS
116 (2d ed. 1952). In Louisiana the answer should be in the affirmative in the
light of Articles 2779 and 2793 of the Civil Code.
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the obligation terminates with the death of the obligee or not.
Rents are also distinguished into onerous and gratuitous, depend-
ing on whether they are founded on consideration or not. Oner-
ous rents are further distinguished according to the nature of
consideration given in exchange thereof; if the consideration is
a sum of money, the rent is called constituted, and if an immov-
able, the rent is called ground-rent.2 8 Contracts establishing
constituted rents are obsolete today; originally, they were de-
vices designed to circumvent the prohibition against usury. A
ground-rent is essentially a sale for a price consisting in a por-
tion of the revenues produced by the immovable rather than a
lump sum. A very important question for Louisiana law today
is whether oil royalties should be characterized as rents or as
sui generis incorporeal immovables. 274
According to Article 474 "shares or interests in banks or
companies of commerce, or industry or other speculations" are
movable by disposition of the law. Although shares or interests
in various associations could be regarded as either movable or
immovable property depending on the type of property owned
by the association, Article 474 indicates that these shares or in-
terests are movable "although such companies be possessed of
immovables. '275 Corresponding provisions in Article 529 of the
French Civil Code have been explained on various grounds. Ac-
cording to one theory, the Code regards the "patrimony" of the
association as a fund dedicated to a distinct purpose. The asso-
ciates thus have two types of property interests- their indi-
vidual property and their shares in the property of the associa-
tion.276 The prevailing view is that the provisions of the French
Civil Code may be sufficiently explained by reference to the dis-
tinct personality of the association. The immovables which the
273. See 3 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TPAITt PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANQAIS
115 (2d ed. 1952). Cf. LA. CIVIL CoDE arts. 2779, 2792, 2794, 2796.
274. In the complex field of mineral rights, generalizations and conceptual clas-
sifications may be misleading since inventiveness, and a large measure of contrac-
tual freedom, resulted in the recognition of several kinds of interests described by
the generic term royalty. In general, Louisiana courts have stated that the mineral
royalty is not a servitude; yet, in Louisiana the mineral royalty has been given
the characteristics of a real right. See DAGGETT, LOUISIANA MINERAL RIGHTS
258 (2d ed. 1949) ; Comment, The Broussard Case and Prescription of Mineral
Royalty, 34 TUL. L. REV. 685 (1960) ; Comment, The Nature of a Royalty Inter-
eat in Louisiana, 13 TuL. L. REv. 279 (1934).
275. Cf. St. Romes v. Levee Steam Cotton-Press Co., 127 U.S. 614 (1888);
State em rel. Waterman v. J. S. Waterman & Co., 178 La. 340, 151 So. 422
(1934) ; Succession of McGuire, 151 La. 514, 92 So. 40 (1922) (corporate stock
as movable).
276. See Mongin, Etude sur la situation juridique des *oiet6a ddnudea de per-
aonnalitd, [1890] REV. CB. Jum. 697.
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association may own are the property of the association; the
interests of the associates are distinct values of a movable char-
acter in their individual patrimonies. These interests consist
in a right to participate in the distribution of any profits while
the association is a going concern, and in the distribution of its
capital upon dissolution.
2 7 7
At the time the French Civil Code was promulgated, legal
personality was attributed only to associations of a commercial
character, as distinguished from associations of a civil law char-
acter. This is the reason why Article 474 of the Louisiana Civil
Code, following Article 529 of the French Code, refers only to
banks, companies of commerce and industry "or other specula-
tions." Shares in civil law associations were regarded at that
time as either movable or immovable, depending on the nature
of the property owned by the associations.2 7 8 The Court of Cas-
sation declared in 1891 that civil associations possessed legal
personality279 and today in France Article 529 of the Code cov-
ers shares in any association. The same is true in Louisiana for
the additional reason that no distinction is drawn between com-
mercial and civil law associations.
Our Code provides that "shares or interests are considered
as movables with respect to every associate as long only as the
society is in existence; but as soon as the society is dissolved, the
right, which each member has to the division of the immovables
belonging to it, produces an immovable action." In France, it is
settled law that the legal personality of an association terminates
upon final liquidation, not upon merely formal dissolution.28°
Accordingly, Article 529 of the French Civil Code applies only
after the process of liquidation is completed and the capital of
the property is divided among the associates. At this moment,
the rights of the associates are regarded as movable or immov-
able depending on the nature of the property divided. Similar
solutions should be acceptable in Louisiana with regard to asso-
ciations not governed by specific legislation.28 1 Characteriza-
tion of shares or interests in associations as movable property
277. See 3 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TRAIT PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANQAIS
118 (2d ed. 1952) ; Cass., Feb. 9, 1864, D. 1864.1.138; Jan. 28, 1884, S. 1886.1.465.
278. See 3 PLANIOL ET RIpEuT, TuaiTt PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRARNQAI5
119 (2d ed. 1952).
279. See Cass., Req. Feb. 23, 1891, D. 1891.1.337; S. 1892.1.73.
280. See Cass., Req. May 29, 1865, D. 1865.1.380
281. See, e.g., LA. R.S. 12:1-71 (1950) (business corporations); LA. R.S.




may carry significant legal consequences. In France, transfer of
shares is governed by rules applicable to movables, with regard
to capacity to dispose: shares are part of the community prop-
erty as movables; the legatee of movables acquires all shares
owned by the testator; and the tutor of a minor is not under a
duty to observe requisite formalities applicable to immovable
property in connection with acquisition of shares.
2 8
Rules of construction
Articles 477 to 480 of the Louisiana Code contain rules of
construction defining the words "furniture, ' ' 28 "movable goods,
movables or movable effects, '2 4 "sale or gift of a house ready
furnished, 2 8 5 and "sale or gift of a house with all that is in
it. ' ' 286 The courts seem to have made little use of these articles.
It is, indeed, rare that the intention of the parties cannot be
gathered from surrounding circumstances, and it is even rarer
that the intention of the parties will correspond to these legal
definitions. These rules become applicable only in case the par-
ties to a contract employ the words defined by the Code and their
intention cannot be ascertained in any other way.
COMPARATIVE LAW
In Roman law, 28 7 things were distinguished into movables
and immovables, but the distinction was only of subordinate in-
terest and did not have the same importance as in modern law.
Land and its component parts were immovables, as provided by
law; all other things were movables. Immovables, according to
destination, were divided into urban (praedia urbana) and rural
(praedia rustica), and, according to location, between Italian
(solum italicum) and provincial (solum provinciale).
In principle, the same rule applied to both movables and im-
movables as to acquisition, loss and transfer of ownership, and
282. See 3 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TRAITt PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANQAIS 120
(2d ed. 1952).
283. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 477 (1870).
284. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 478 (1870).
285. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 479 (1870).
286. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 480 (1870). Of. Hicks v. Levett, 19 La. App. 836,
140 So. 276 (2d Cir. 1932).
287. See BUCKLAND, A TEXT-BOOK OF ROMAN LAW 186 (2d ed. 1932);
MONIER, MANUEL It.LMENTAIRE DE DROIT ROMAIN 353 (6th ed. 1947) ; 1 HUVELIN,
COURS IkLIMENTAIRE DE DROIT ROmAIN 421 (1927); SOHM-MITTEIS-WENGEB, IN-
STITUTIONEN DES RMISCHEN RECHTS 256 (1923); WEISS, INSTITUTIONEN DES
R6MISCHEN PRIVATRECHTS 128 (1949).
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other real rights. Different rules of law applied to movables and
immovables in connection with possessory actions, usucapion,
theft, and dotal property. 28 8 Predial servitudes, emphyteusis,
and superficies could exist only on immovables and were subject
to specific regulation. The distinction was never generalized so
as to include all things: successions and obligations were neither
movables nor immovables. 2 9
The provisions of the French Civil Code, though fewer in
number and much more concise, are very similar to those of the
Louisiana Civil Code. Reference to particular issues and solu-
tions given in France has been made in connection with the anal-
ysis of Louisiana law. Here, the discussion is necessarily limited
to a schematic approach. 290
The distinction between movables and immovables is estab-
lished in Article 516 of the French Civil Code. An immovable
is defined as a thing having a fixed place in space, and a mov-
able as a thing which can either move itself or be removed in
space. As in Louisiana, the distinction does not always corre-
spond with physical notions of mobility and is applicable to both
corporeal and incorporeal things. The distinction between mov-
ables and immovables entails legal consequences attributable
either to the nature of the things concerned or to their relative
value. The law, taking into account the nature of things, has de-
veloped particular rules which apply to immovable property in
connection with transfer, security transactions, seizure, acquisi-
tive prescription, possession, jurisdiction of courts, and conflict
of laws. Another set of rules which apply to immovable prop-
erty derives, historically, from the relatively greater importance
of landed property. These rules concern capacity to dispose,
community property, dotal property, and inheritance taxes.
Immovables are distinguished into immovables by nature, im-
movables by destination, and immovables by their object. In ad-
dition to these three categories established by the Civil Code,
French doctrine and jurisprudence created two more categories:
immovables by declaration and immovables by accession.291 Land,
288. See BUCKLAND, A TEXT-BOOK o ROMAN LAW 186 (2d ed. 1932).
289. See 1 HUVELIN, COURS ]LAMENTAIRE DE DROIT ROMAIN 421 (1927).
290. See in general 2 AUBRY ET RAU, COURS DE DROIT CIVIL FRANCAIS 27-30,
35-40 (5th ed. 1897) ; 1 COLIN-CAPITANT ET JULLIOT DE LA MORANDIARz, TRAIr
DE DROIT CIVIL 837-848 (1953) ; 9 DEMOLOMBE, TRAInb DE LA DISTINCTION DES
BIZNS 243-298 (1874-82) ; 3 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TRAITA PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL
IRANVAIS 101-121 (2d ed. 1952).
291. The category of things immovable by declaration is confined to obliga-
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all vegetation adhering to the soil, and buildings or other
structures are immovables by nature. Immovability attaches to
all parts of a building which are incorporated into it and which
are destined to complete it. According to the Law of April 21,
1810, mineral concessions constitute immovable property distinct
from the surface of the soil. This horizontal division of immov-
able property results in the recognition of two distinct immov-
ables by nature: the mine and the surface. 292
Immovables by destination are movables retaining their in-
dividuality but regarded as immovables because of their close
association with a tract of land or building. In principle, immov-
ables by destination are governed by the same rules of law gov-
erning immovables by nature; but there are several exceptions
to the principle.2 93 For effective immobilization two things are
necessary: ownership of the movable and immovable in the same
person and a relationship of association. Accordingly, things
placed on the premises by persons other than the owner do not
become immovable by destination. This rule, however, applies
only to the relations between the owner of the land and the own-
er of the movable things. With regard to third parties, things not
belonging to the owner of the land are treated as immovables by
destination. The provisions relating to immobilization are con-
sidered as rules of a "mandatory" character, and, for this rea-
son, cannot be altered by contrary party agreement. 294 Immobili-
zation ceases by actual detachment of the things immobilized.
This indicates that the most important condition for immobiliza-
tion is the establishment of a relationship between the immov-
able and the movable.
Close association between a movable and an immovable may
be effected by actual attachment or without attachment. A mov-
able destined for the service and improvement of an immovable
tions of the Bank of France and to rents due by the state to municipalities, public
institutions, and public utilities investing funds received gratuitously. The cate-
gory of things immovable by accession is limited to mineral royalties so long as
they are owned by the owner of the surface. See Law of April 21, 1810, art. 18.
The nationalization of the Bank of France and of mines has rendered these two
categories devoid of any practical interest. See 3 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TRAITt
PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANQAIS 99-100 (2d ed. 1952).
292. See LENaEREAU, ESSAI SUR LA NATURE JURIDIQUE DE LA PROPRItTt
MINIk1RE 16 (Diss. Toulouse 1922).
293. These exceptions relate to vendor's liens, expropriation, and warrant
hotelier (chattel mortgage of hotel furniture). See 3 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TRAiTt
PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANQAIS 80 (2d ed. 1952).
294. See 3 id. 83. Of. Cass. Req. July 31, 1879, D. 1880.1.273; Cass. Div.
Nov. 9, 1885, D. 1886.1.125.
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is immobilized without regard to actual attachment. The mov-
able must be necessary for the service of the immovable and not
merely for the convenience of the occupant. The French Civil
Code provided expressly only for agricultural and industrial ex-
ploitation, but courts and doctrine have extended Article 524
to cover any type of destination. Exploitation is not necessary;
any use is sufficient. Agricultural destination includes practic-
ally all implements, animals, and supplies necessary for continu-
ous operation of farms. Industrial destination includes not only
heavy machinery but also light equipment in offices. Commer-
cial destination extends to hotels, furnished homes, and several
other establishments destined for commercial ends.2 95 Residen-
tial destination extends to all accessories destined to serve and
complete private homes: keys, carpets, and venetian blinds are
included. In general, the Court of Cassation has treated the
issue of immobilization without actual attachment as a question
of intention and fact.296 Things may also become immovable by
destination as a result of their permanent attachment to a tract
of land or building. Article 525 of the French Civil Code men-
tions attachment "by mortar or plaster," but this has been re-
garded by the courts as merely indicative of several possible
methods of attachment.2 97 This article has been treated as repe-
titious and unnecessary. 298 Indeed, things permanently attached
by mortar or plaster are necessarily things destined to the serv-
ice and improvement of immovables and are covered by the pre-
ceding Article 524.
All rights having as their object a corporeal immovable are
incorporeal immovables. Servitudes, use and habitation, and
emphyteusis 299 always have as their object immovable property,
and it follows that these are immovable rights. Usufruct, en-
cumbrances, obligations to give, and actions may be movable or
immovable rights depending on their objects. Mineral rights8°°
295 See Nancy, Ct. of App., Dec. 4, 1936, 1937 D.H. 123. Of. Toulouse Ct.
of App., Aug. 4, 1883, S. 1884.2.8; Cass., Nov. 9, 1885, D. 1886.1.125.
296. See Cass., Req. July 31, 1879, D. 1880.1.273; Req. Nov. 9, 1885, D.
1886.1.125; Req. Aug. 2, 1886, D. 1887.1.293; Civ. Feb. 8, 1926, 5. 1926.1.153.
297. See Cass., Civ. Jan. 17, 1859, D. 1859.1.68; Req. Oct. 19, 1896, D.
1897.1.15; Req. March 17, 1931, 1931 D.H. 233; Civ. Oct. 18, 1950, 1950 GAZ. PAL.
2.411.
. 298. See 3 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TRAiTrt PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANgAIS 94
'(2d ed. 1952).
299. Law of June 25, 1902, S. 505 (1903).
300. Law of Sept. 9, 1919, arts. 1-4 B.L.D. 668 (1919) ; Law of June 28,
1927, B.L.D. 303 (1927) ; and Feb. 9, 1930, B.L.D. 94 (1930).
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and the right to exploit hydraulic energy are, according to spe-
cial legislation, always immovable rights. 8°0
As in the Louisiana Civil Code, movables are distinguished
in the French Civil Code into movables by their nature and mov-
ables by disposition of the law (Article 527). Doctrine has
established the additional category of movables by anticipa-
tion.0 2 This category includes standing crops, timber, and min-
eral substances to be extracted from the ground. Movables by
nature are corporeal objects and energies. Provisions similar to
those of the Louisiana Civil Code refer to materials collected
for erecting an edifice and materials arisirg from demolitions.
Vessels and airplanes, though movable, are for certain purposes
subject to rules governing immovable property. A right having
as its object a movable thing is an incorporeal movable, namely,
a movable by disposition of the law. Certain legal offices,3° 8
business assets,8 0 4 and literary, artistic, and patent rights are
also incorporeal movables. Obligations to do or not to do, rents,
and shares in an association, regardless of the nature of their
capital structure, belong to the same category.
Under the German Civil Code, land, namely parts of the sur-
face of the earth individualized by the human activity of setting
boundaries, and its component parts, as defined by law, are im-
movables. 0 5 Conversely, all things which are neither the land
nor component parts thereof are movables. The distinction be-
tween things movable and immovable carries significant conse-
quences in German law. Content and scope of ownership, as well
as the acquisition and transfer of things, are regulated by dif-
301. Law of Oct. 16, 1919, B.L.D. 751 (1919).
302. See FR JAVILLE, DES MEUBLES PAR ANTICIPATION (Diss. Paris 1927).
303. The offices of lawyers, notaries, law clerks, bailiffs, and court inter-
preters are regarded as the objects of incorporeal property rights which are classi-
fied as movables. See 1 COLIN-CAPITANT ET JULLIOT DE LA MORANDItkRE, TRAIT]t
DE DROIT CIVIL 845 (1953).
304. Business assets (fonds do commerce) are generally regarded as a univer-
sality containing both corporeal and incorporeal elements. According to some
authors the several elements of a fond de commerce retain their individual juridical
natures and are governed by the appropriate rules of law. But the prevailing
view, followed by the French courts, is that this universality has a distinct exist-
ence and is an incorporeal movable. See 3 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TRAITII PRATIQUE
DE DROIT CIVIL FRANQAIS 103 (2d ed. 1952).
305. See LEHMANN, ALLGEMEINER TEIL DES BtRGERLICHEN GESETZEUCHES 357
(1957); 1 ENNECCERUS-NIPPERDEY, 1 ALLGEMEINER TEIL DES BtBGERLICHEN
RECHTS 503 (1952); 1 STAUDINOER, KOMMENTAR ZUM BtRGERLICHEN GESETZ-
BUCH, ALLGEMEINER TELL 417 (1957). Component parts of the land are distin-
guished into essential and non-essential. Essential component parts of the land
are immovable by definition. See infra note 308. Non-essential component parts
of the land are immovable, according to the Reichsgericht, while their association
with the land continues. See R.G. Nov. 14, 1938, 158 R.G.Z. 362, 369 (1938).
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ferent rules, depending on the nature of things as movable or
immovable. Classification of things as movable or immovable
involves difficulties in German law only in connection with the
question of whether a movable is a component part of an immov-
able or not. Immobilization by destination is unknown in Ger-
man law. But consequences comparable to those flowing in
France and Louisiana from the classification of a thing as im-
movable by destination result in Germany from a finding that a
movable has become a component part or accessory of an im-
movable. A brief analysis, therefore, of the law governing prin-
cipal things, component parts, and accessories is here appropri-
ate.
A thing may consist of only one substance, a "simple thing,"
or alternatively, it may be composed of several "component
parts" which lost their identity and are regarded as one "com-
posite thing" while the association lasts. Component parts are
classified as "essential" or "non-essential." Article 93 defines
essential component parts to be those "which cannot be separ-
ated from each other without destruction of one part or another
or without essential change in their substance."8 06 All things
which are not classified as "essential" component parts are "non-
essential." In general, factual relations of things and prevailing
conceptions in society determine lines of demarcation and classi-
fication of things as essential or non-essential component parts.
Apart from the test established by Article 93 of the Civil Code,
essential component parts of a tract of land are things "firmly
fixed to the ground, especially buildings and the products of the
ground so long as they remain attached thereto,"80 7 and essential
component parts of a building are "those things which are placed
together for the construction of a building."'8 08 Things attached
only temporarily to a tract of land or building and "buildings or
other constructions attached to the ground of another by one
having the right to do so" are not component parts. 0 9 But
306. GERMAN CIVIL CODE art. 93. The Reichsgericht has classified as com-
ponent parts, whether essential or non-essential, elevators in a hotel building:
R.G. May 5, 1917, 90 R.G.Z. 198 (1917) ; steam and electric motors in a furni-
ture factory: R.G. Dec. 10, 1931, [1932] J.W. 1197; a diesel engine in a ship:
R.G. Aug. 4, 1936, 152 R.G.Z. 91 (1936).
307. GERMAN CIVIL CODE art. 94(1).
308. Id. art. 94(2).
309. Id. art. 95(1) : "Things which are not attached to the ground permanently
are not component parts thereof. The same rule applies to buildings or other con-
structions which are attached to the ground of another person by one having the
right to do so.




"rights connected with the ownership of a tract of land are re-
garded as component parts thereof."810 The significance of the
classification of a thing as an essential component part is that,
so long as the association lasts, this thing is insusceptible of
separate real rights and follows the principal thing in all cases
of alienation or encumbrance.8 1' Non-essential component parts,
on the other hand, are susceptible of separate real rights but
follow the principal thing in the absence of provision to the con-
trary. Essential component parts of an immovable are regarded
as an immovable; non-essential component parts of an immov-
able preserve their status as movables3 12
Analysis of the German law relating to accessories starts
with the elementary proposition that things which preserve their
identity may exist in a relationship of coordination with each
other (spoon and fork) or in a relationship of subordination
(house and key). In the second relationship, the subordinate
thing is called an accessor'y. The German Civil Code provides
that "accessories are movables which, without being component
parts of the principal thing, are destined to serve its economic
purpose and which stand with regard to the principal thing in
a space relationship appropriate to their destination." 18
For the characterization of a thing as an accessory several
conditions must be met. Obviously, two things are needed: one
must be the principal and the other the accessory. The accessory
must be a movable thing which preserves its identity and does
not become a component part of the principal. The accessory
must serve, permanently, the economic purpose of the principal
thing. Temporary use of a thing for the economic purpose of
another thing does not render it an accessory, nor does tem-
310. Id. art. 96. The nature of these rights as essential or non-essential com-
ponent parts is not determined by the Code.
311. Id. art. 93. This rule is regarded as "mandatory." Post-war legislation,
however, has established a notable exception: individual apartment ownership is
permissible in Germany. See 1 ENNECCERUs-NIPPERDEY, 1 ALLGEMEINER TEIL DES
BRGERLICHEN RECHTS 525 (1952).
312. See I ENNECCERUS-NIPPERDEY, 1 ALLGEMEINER TEIL DES BfJRGERLICHEN
RECHTS 529 (1952). But cf. R.G. supra note 305.
313. GERMAN CIVIL CODE art. 97(1). Classification of a thing as principal,
component part, or accessory may depend on the circumstances. The lighting and
heating systems in a hotel are regarded as component parts of the building, cars
used in the business as accessories, and the private car of the owner as an
individual or principal thing. See R.G. Jan. 26, 1901, 47 R.G.Z. 197, 200 (1901).
The Reichsgericht has also held that networks for the distribution of gas and
electricity, if not component parts of the factory, are its accessories. See R.G.




porary detachment of an accessory from the principal thing af-
fect its status . 14 Economic purpose is determined by reference
to the actual use of the principal thing, and, ordinarily, this must
be proved.315 Thus, a piano in a bar is not per se an accessory
of the business. Proof of economic purpose is dispensed with
in connection with certain objects enumerated in Article 98 of
the German Civil Code. According to this article, machinery and
other apparatus necessary for the operation of industrial estab-
lishments, and implements, animals, and supplies needed for the
continuous operation of farms are destined to serve the economic
purpose of the principal thing. 16 Accessnries stand in a de-
pendency relationship to the principal. Raw materials in a fac-
tory, and, a fortiori, finished products are not regarded as ac-
cessories; but coal intended for consumption in a factory has
been treated as an accessory. 1 7 Spare parts of machinery are
accessories, but emergency equipment destined to be replaced is
not.""' The accessory must stand in close space relationship
with the principal thing, though bodily contact is not required.
Proximity is decided in each case as a fact. The accessory need
not be in its proper place: the German Supreme Court, the
Reichsgericht, held that machinery brought in and left in the
courtyard of a factory was an accessory since it was destined to
replace worn-out parts.8 19 The last requirement for the charac-
terization of a thing as an accessory is a negative one: the Civil
Code provides that "a thing is not an accessory if it is not re-
garded as an accessory in trade.' 3 20
314. GERMAN CML CODE art. 97(2).
315. In general, the one asserting the character of a thing as accessory must
prove his allegation. Exception is made with regard to the proof of the negative
requirements, namely, that the attachment of the thing is not temporary and that
the prevailing views in business does not deny the quality of the thing as accessory.
See infra text at note 320.
316. "The following objects are destined to serve the economic purpose of the
principal thing: 1. In buildings permanently fitted out for industrial destination,
particularly a mill, a smithy, a brewery, a factory, the machinery and other ap-
paratus necessary for their operation. 2. On farms, the implements and cattle
needed for farming purposes, agricultural products in so far .as they are needed
for the continuance of the establishment, up to the time at which prospectively
the same or similar products will be earned, as well as the manure produced on
the farm." See also id. art. 952. According to this article, debt notes and de-
bentures not issued to the order of the bearer are accessory to the right they
embody. The right to the paper follows the right represented by the paper. In
truly negotiable instruments the situation is the converse.
317. See R.G. March 17, 1915, 86 R.G.Z. 326 (1915); R.G. July 4, 1911,
77 R.G.Z. 36 (1911).
, 318. See R.G. March 17, 1915, 86 R.G.Z. 326, 330 (1915); R.G. March 12,
1914, 84 R.G.Z. 284 (1914).
319.. See R.G. May 3, 1902, 51 R.G.Z. 272 (1902).
320. GERMAN CIVIL CODE art. 97(1), (2).
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The practical significance of the characterization of a thing
as an accessory consists in the fact that in certain instances the
accessory follows the principal thing. The law, relying on con-
siderations of economic utility, protects the relationship between
the principal thing and its accessories and regards them as form-
ing an economic unity. But while in the case of essential com-
ponent parts the things so characterized always follow the prin-
cipal thing, accessories follow the principal thing only in enu-
merated instances in the absence of contrary party intention. It
is disputed in Germany whether scattered code provisions may
be taken to establish a general principle with regard to acces-
sories. The German Civil Code provides specifically that juridi-
cal acts generating obligations to alienate or encumber a princi-
pal thing, in case of doubt, include its accessories.8 21 Further,
alienation of an immovable or of certain rights governed by
rules applicable to immovable property includes, in case of doubt,
all accessories, 22 provided that these belong to the transferor.
There are no corresponding provisions applicable to transfers of
movables. The generally accepted view in Germany is that the
above-mentioned provisions apply by analogy, except that in-
dependent delivery of accessories may be required to effect
transfer of ownership. Real mortgages, land charges, rent debts,
and foreclosure of real mortgages include in all cases accessories
belonging to the owner of the ground.2 3 These accessories can-
not be pledged separately.
24
The provisions of the German Civil Code relating to acces-
sories have been criticized as too narrow. 21 Indeed, only cor-
poreal objects can have accessories, and only movables can be
accessories. Thus, in the case of transfer of an enterprise or
business as a going concern, the rules relating to accessories
have no direct application. Neither enterprise nor business is a
"thing" under the German Civil Code. Yet, it seems almost im-
perative that a transfer of business should include all its com-
ponent parts and accessories, and all incorporeal rights such as
trademarks and patents which are necessary for the business's
continuous operation. The Reichsgericht, however, was able to
321. Id. arts. 314, 498, 2164.
322. Id. arts. 926, 1031, 1093, 1096.
323. Id. arts. 1120, 1192, 1199.
324. GERMAN CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 865; Law of March 24, 1897
arts. 20, 21, 55, 146.




reach desirable results in proper cases by reference to party in-
tention and by broad interpretation of business transactions.3 26
The Greek Civil Code follows in the main the German Civil
Code in this area. Most deviations from the German Civil Code
are improvements in drafting and organization designed to cor-
rect a number of deficiencies which became apparent during sev-
eral decades of practice in Germany. Things are distinguished
under the Greek Civil Code into movables and immovables. 82 T
This distinction applies to corporeal objects only, with one excep-
tion: Article 949 provides that where the law or juridical acts
refer to "movabre patrimony," as distinguished from "immov-
able patrimony," among the movables are included all obliga-
tions and among the immovables the usufruct and servitudes on
immovables. In several other instances, the Code indicates that
certain rights are governed by rules applicable to immovable
property, 28 but these provisions do not affect the nature of the
(incorporeal) rights concerned. The provision of Article 949 is
regarded as a rule of interpretation, applicable in the absence of
other indication. All other provisions are regarded as rules of
public policy which cannot be derogated from contrary party
agreement.
As in Germany, distinction is made between principal things,
component parts, and accessories. Component parts of an im-
movable may be either movables or immovables; component
parts of a movable can be only movables. Component parts are
distinguished into those susceptible of separate real rights and
those not susceptible. According to Article 953, things insuscep-
tible of separate real rights are the same things defined as essen-
tial component parts in Germany. 29 Apart from this provision,
and without regard to the tests it establishes, according to the
following Article 954, things insusceptible of separate real rights
are those firmly fixed to the ground, especially buildings, mov-
ables incorporated into a structure or building, vegetation and
mineral substances, water under the surface, seeds when sown,
and plants when planted. Firm attachment exists when detach-
326. Cf. R.G. April 22, 1921, 102 R.G.Z. 127 (1921); R.G. Dec. 19, 1925,
112 R.G.Z. 242, 244 (1925).
327. GREEK CIVIL CODE art. 948: "Immovables are the soil and its component
parts. Everything which is not immovable is movable."
328. See, e.g., id. arts. 369, 1121, 1143, 1192, 1193, 1259.
329. "The component part of a thing which cannot be separated from the
principal thing without damage or alteration to it or to the principal thing, or
without alteration of their substance or destination, cannot be the subject of
separate ownership or other real rights."
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ment would necessitate excessive effort or expense.380 The list
is considered to be exclusive rather than indicative. Predial
servitudes are not mentioned and it follows that, contrary to
the German Civil Code, servitudes are not component parts of
an immovable."-" The Code provides expressly that things at-
tached to the ground or building for temporary purposes, though
firmly fixed, do not become component parts insusceptible of
separate real rights. The same rule applies to buildings and
other structrues erected on the ground of another by a usu-
fructuary or other person having a real right.88 2 These things
remain movable and are susceptible of real rights distinguishable
from those existing with respect to the land.
The practical consequences of the characterization of a thing
as a component part insusceptible of separate real rights are sig-
nificant. The owner is always free to terminate this relationship
of association by actual detachment; but while association lasts,
separate ownership and separate real rights are not recognized.
Seizure and any real transfer or encumbrance include all com-
ponent parts of this kind, even if incorporated subsequently.
However, according to special legislation, machinery in indus-
trial plants, in order to be included in a real mortgage, must be
mentioned specifically, and standing crops may be seized separ-
ately from the land.888 Real rights to the movables prior to in-
corporation are extinguished and do not revive upon detachment.
Real rights acquired on component parts of a thing by incor-
poration continue to exist even after the movables are detached.
Exception is made as to the rights of a real mortgagee; movables
covered by the mortgage may be detached and transferred to
third parties free of the mortgage.88 4 Contrary party agreement
cannot alter the legal consequences of the characterization of a
thing as a component part insusceptible of separate real rights.
Parties, however, may in their private relations create contrac-
tual rights (as distinguished from real rights) to things which
are component parts insusceptible of separate real rights. Thus,
the sale of standing crops, standing timber, and mineral sub-
stances are all valid transactions if made according to the for-
malities governing movable property. But no real rights are cre-
330. See BAxns, GENERaAL PRINCIPLES OF CIVIL LAW 505 (1955) (in Greek).
331. Ibid.
332. GREEK CIVIL CODE art. 955.
333. See Law 4112 of 1929.
334'. GREK CIVIL CODE art. 1283.
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ated by transactions which concern future things; in case of non-
performance, the purchaser is entitled to damages only.
Contrary to the general rule, the Civil Code and special'legis-
lation have established exceptions whereby essential component
parts of an immovable may be susceptible of separate real rights.
According to Article 1023 of the Civil Code, trees on a boundary
may be subject to ownership separate from that of the ground,
and according to Article 1002, apartments in buildings may also
be owned separately. According to special legislation, mines are
immovables distinct from the surface, and standing crops may
be hypothecated as distinct immovables.
The provisions of the Greek Civil Code relating to accessories
are almost a verbatim translation of the corresponding articles
in the German Civil Code. 885 As in Germany, accessories follow
the principal thing in the instances specified by the law and only
in the absence of other indication.8  These rules of interpreta-
tion, though applicable to real transactions only, may apply ac-
cording to the prevailing view by analogy to all transactions.
Thus, transfer of a business or enterprise will, in the absence
of other indication, include all corporeal and incorporeal objects
qualifying as its accessories.
837
CONCLUSIONS
The division of things into movables and immovables per-
vades the entire body of civil law and also carries significant
consequences in several fields of public law. "Immovability" has
been historically associated with additional safeguards and more
effective protection of ownership. In contemporary society, it
seems desirable that certain species of wealth should be given
the kind of protection which was traditionally attributed to im-
movable property. This can be done by the fictitious classifica-
tion of certain values as "immovables" or by specific regulatory
legislation applicable to these values. In a future revision of the
Civil Code, Louisiana legislators will thus face a policy prob-
335. Id. arts. 956, 957, 959, 960. Accessories are susceptible of separate real
rights. See BALIS, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CIVIL LAW 515 (1955) (in Greek).
336. See GREEK CIVIL CODE art. 958, announcing the general rule that "every
juridical act involving a real right on the principal thing [real transaction],
includes also, in case of doubt, the accessory." It is presupposed that the acces-
sory belongs to the owner of the principal thing. See also id. art. 1286 (differing
from the solution given under the corresponding Article 97 of the German Civil
Code).
337. See BALLs, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CIVIL LAW 517 (1955) (in Greek).
'Cf. Gazrx CIVIL CODE art. 370.
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lem, namely, designation of values which need increased protec-
tion, and a problem of legal esthetics, namely, determination of
a method of regulation. In that regard, it may be expected that
the traditional "division" will be re-examined, and the terminol-
ogy re-defined.
Perhaps the distinction between movables and immovables
should apply to corporeal things only. Extension of the distinc-
tion to incorporeal things and creation of a category of "incor-
poreal immovables" should be reconsidered. It is possible to
avoid fictions by a provision indicating that certain enumerated
rights shall be subject to all or only some of the rules governing
immovable property, applied by analogy. Mineral rights could
be treated as an independent category of rights governed by
rules applicable to immovable property.
The distinction of immovable things as immovable by na-
ture, by destination, or by their object should also be recon-
sidered. Perhaps the category of "incorporeal immovables" is
an avoidable fiction, as indicated hereinabove. The usefulness
of the category "immovables by destination" may also be ques-
tioned. The essence of the problem is determination of circum-
stances in which movables may be regarded as indispensable
accessories of an immovable. As the law stands today, the clas-
sification "immovables by destination" is meaningless in con-
nection with vendors' liens, agricultural implements on mort-
gaged land, and with regard to all things subject to chattel
mortgage in case of transfer or encumbrance of the land. In
addition, immobilization by destination is immaterial in connec-
tion with certain home appliances which, according to special
legislation, are regarded as immovables and as parts of the
building until the indebtedness they secure is fully paid. Thus,
in case of a future code revision, problems of immobilization
by destination may be dealt with simply by provisions indicating
which movables should be regarded as included in a transfer
or mortgage of an immovable, according to the presumed inten-
tion of the parties and in the absence of other indication. If,
for historical reasons, the category of things immovable by
destination were to be retained, care should be taken to indicate
which things may be immobilized, under what circumstances,
and for which purposes.
It seems, therefore, that a revised Civil Code should provide
for only one category of immovables, namely, immovables by
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nature. There are today in Louisiana several categories of im-
movables by nature under both the Revised Statutes and the
Civil Code. According to well settled jurisprudence, land, tim-
ber, buildings, parts of buildings, and a number of structures
regarded as buildings are treated as immovables for all pur-
poses. The category of "immovable" things could well be limited
to these. Provision should be made, however, to indicate that
certain corporeal things, such as standing crops, and certain
rights should be subject to all or only some of the rules govern-
ing immovable property. Care should be also taken to indicate
the circumstances in which movables may become part of a
building by incorporation. In that regard, the test of permanent
attachment under Article 469 of the Civil Code may be the
proper solution.
The foregoing conclusions reflect in part the conceptual tech-
nique of the German and Greek Civil Codes. Closer rapproche-
ment is not desirable; these codes are destined to be applied by
a judiciary trained exclusively in the civilian tradition and often
inclined to resort to a mechanical judicial process. In Louisiana,
the legal profession is accustomed to pragmatic ways of think-
ing and to a less rigorous conceptualism. This means that there
should be express provisions designed to cover specific situa-
tions, and propositions which might be regarded as self-evident
by continental jurists. A Louisiana Civil Code cannot be entirely
free of didactic materials.
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